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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND FOR NICHOLAS' THOUGHT
During the first sixty-four years of the fifteenth century
an energetic churchman, Nicholas of Cusa, pursued an active career
as a diplomat, administrator and reformer.

However, in spite of

the demands of church affairs, which included some highly contro
versial reform attempts, Nicholas produced a large body of writings
dealing with science, mathematics and philosophy.

Well-educated

in these fields, he in turn made original and occasionally in
fluential contributions to each of these disciplines.

His work

in all three areas, as well as in his career, stemmed from and
in turn reinforced his basic belief that all knowledge and exis
tence were interdependent and ultimately reconciled in an absolute
and simple whole.

It was on this concept that Nicholas estab

lished his metaphysical system by which he hoped to demonstrate
the truths of the Christian revelation.
Although the central theme of Cusanus thought is unity,
this paper will seek to determine the role of individuality
within the absolute whole.

It will examine Nicholas' attitude

toward individual existence and human thought.

Does he recog

nize a positive place for individuality within his system which
emphasizes the reality of the whole?

Nicholas' views of the

relationship of the individual to his society and to his environ
ment are not only of interest to the historian of thought, but
remain relevant to those involved with such concerns today.
Nicholas developed an original synthesis which is not

1
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easily classified by period or school.

Some scholars claim that

he is the "first modern thinker" while others insist that he is
the last of the great medieval minds, incorporating many earlier
trends of thought.

However, Nicholas' system, although it was tra

ditional in its desire to combine in a rational way the elements of
faith and reason, does not fit any label but remains strikingly
his own.

He did not, of course, write in a vacuum, and it is pos-

sible to observe many of the influences from which he shaped his
ideas.

A recognition of these elements gives some indication of

the point of departure of his thought as well as of his originality.
He represents neither a rehash of earlier ideas nor a radical break
with the past.
Of particular influence in Nicholas' thought was Neoplatoniam
This philosophy generally held

and its Christian interpretation.

that reality was One; that is, that the finite emenates and re
turns to transcendent simply unity.

Although totally separate,

infinite and finite are inextricably involved.
being is in the One, which is spiritual.

True reality or

The nearer or more simi-

lar something is to the One, the more it has being or reality.
Some of the Neoplatonist mystics, such as pseudo-Dionysius, fifth
century writer, and John Scotus Eriugina (C.81O-C.875), emphasized
in their writings the unfathomable quality of this One who was un
limited and therefore unnamable.

They advocated a negative theo

logy which held that the most accurate knowledge of God came from
a process by which all the names of God were eliminated during med
itation, enabling the soul to apprehend in a transcendental way

3

the Nothing which is, of course, Everything.
because the soul was the image of the One.

This was possible

These were central

ideas in Neoplatonist thought and they all appear in Cusanus'
work, although in altered form.
In addition to the general influence of Neoplatonism,
Nicholas occasionally used specific ideas from earlier writers.
For example, Nicholas, who was a fervent lecturer and annotator
of Proclus' Parmedide, develops in his own work a concept of the
1
Absolute which corresponds to the "exalted unity" of that work.
And he would have found in his study of Eckhart his idea of a
2
coincidentia-oppositorum.

In his book Nicholas of Cusa, Henry

Bett analyses the influence of both Eriugena and Augustine on
specific aspects of Cusanus' thinking, particularly concerning
.

.

the Trinity.

3

Thus, there can be recognized in Nicholas' system

a strong link to Neoplatonist and Christian Neoplatonist thought.
Nicholas drew on other writers who proceeded him.
these was St. Anselm who defined God in his Prosologion:

One of
"We

believe that Thou art a being than which none greater can be
conceived."
1
Cues,"

(aliguid, quo nihil magius colgitari possit).4

Maurice de Gandillac, "Les 'Conjectures' de Nicholas de
Revue de Metaphysigues et de Morale, 77 (July 1972), 361.

2Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London, 1932). Bett cites
several direct quotes from Eckhart's writings; see especially
p. 94 and 105.
3Ibid., p. 102.
4Anselm, Prosologian, Chapter II, taken from A Scholastic
Miscelleny (E. R. Fairweather, ed.); New York: Macmillan Co.,
p. 73.
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Nicholas' conception of the Maximum is so similar that it is
thought by some writers to have been derived from Anselm.

1

Cusanus also seems to adopt Anselm's argument that a highest
truth must exist.

2

Echoing Anselm he writes:

All that we can say or think is exhausted by the
following propositions which are the maximum truth
on the absolute maximum itself: it is or it is not;
it is and it is not; it neither is nor it is not.
My point is made no matter which of these you affirm
as truth at its maximum, for in the simple maximum
I have the maximum truth. (De d. ig., I, vi).
Another philosopher whom Nicholas avidly studied was Raymond
3
Lull (1235-1315).

During the year 1427-1428, while at Cologne,

he copied and analyzed Lull's work.

There are thirty-nine of

Lull's writings at Nicholas' library at Kues, more than those of
any other author.

It is also generally accepted that Nicholas

was familiar with William of Occam and the Averroists, both be
cause of the philosophical bent of some of the schools he attended
and because a certain nominalism seems to be incorporated into
4
his ideas.
Even from these few examples it can be seen that

1

For examples see Bett, 212.· cit., p. 125, and D.J.B.
Hawkins (ed.), Of Learned Ignorance, p. xviii.
2

3

Anselm,

212.· cit., chapters I and II.

According to J. N. Hilgarth's Raymond Lull and Lullism
in Fourteenth Century France (Oxford, 1971) Lull was an unusual
and interesting scholar. In the Neo-platonist mold, he was de
dicated to bringing Islam into Christianity through the discovery
of common truths. He was fascinated by algebra and used math
ematical and alphabetical symbols to illustrate his ideas. His
mysticism, religious tolerance and interest in the names of God
remind one of Cusanus.
4 .

.

.

Giuseppe Bufo, Nicholas de Cues, ou La metaphysigue de la
finitude (Paris, 1964), p. 14; Emile Brehier, History of Philo
sophy (Chicago, 1965) III, 220.

5

Nicholas was familiar with and had carefully examined the writ
ings of other philosophers and that they helped to form some of
the fundamentals of his thought.
Another important intellectual influence on Nicholas was
his training and experimentation in mathematics and science.

He

studied under Paolo Toscanelli (1397-1482) who was an outstanding
mathematician, interested in theoretical mathematics.

Nicholas'

ability in this field is commented on by E. Cassirer:
As a mathematician, Cusanus immediately gathered
about him a wide circle of students, including
Purebach and Regionentus, as well as a large num
ber of Italian mathematicians. At that time Italy
possessed no truly leading mind in the field of
mathematics, no thinkers comparable to Cusanus in
the originality and profundity he showed in setting
up the problem. According to M. Cantor in his work
on the mathematicians of the fifteenth century,
"there was only one highly gifted mind with the
stamp of inventor: Cusanus11 • 1
Nicholas was equally interested in scientific study, particularly
weights and measures, and astronomy.

His involvement in these

areas has to be considered as a major element in his thinking
for they clearly shaped his approach to philosophical problems
and probably enabled him to enrich earlier ideas with new in
sights.
Other influences on Nicholas such as schools, family background, humanism and the conciliar movement will be discussed in
a later biographical sketch.

To some extent each of these may have

helped to mold his thought, including his views on individuality.
1

Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renais
sance Philosophy (Oxford, 1964), p. 58.
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In many cases Nicholas' ideas appear to correspond with the
most recent thinking in physics and philosophy and it is possible
to show examples of some of his speculations which were later
proven to be scientifically and mathematically sound.

Yet it

should always be acknowledged that Nicholas was the product of a
rich heritage and did not break from the past either by intent
or result.

His ultimate view of reality was not unlike many me

dieval works and can be found, for example, in the final canto
of Dante's Paradisio.

For Dante the journey to understanding

involves the purgation of sin while for Nicholas it is the striv
ing of the mind for learned ignorance, but for each the conclusions are the same:

the center and the circumference of the

universe are one; this one is God who is the unchanging, utterly
simple form of forms, above mortal conception, and the source and
object of desire.
Nicholas drew together ideas and observations from many
sources.

From them he fashioned a unique approach within a tra

ditional framework.

Although he stated that his system came to

him in a moment of revelation, his ideas are not radically dif
ferent from those of his predecessors.

Nevertheless they are

unique and thoughtful and remain of enduring interest.

With

these comments as a brief orientation to Cusanus' thought, we
shall examine the fundamental premises of his system and their
consequences for individuality.

CHAPTER II
THE IDEA OF NUMBER
In order to discover the place of the individual in Cusanus'
thought it is necessary to understand his metaphysical system.
This system is basically contained in one work, his De docta
ignorantia.

Although he wrote many other treatises, they are

generally recapitulations of the ideas found in this initial presentation.
the same.

The crucial ideas, if not the nomenclature, remain
Nicholas, a philosopher and mathematician, arrives at

his system by drawing conclusions based on the idea of number.
Number itself exists, he states, because "if number is denied,
then the distinction, hierarchy, relationship, harmony and even
plurality of beings must be denied" (De d. ig., I, v).

1

It seems

to me that the concept of number, by which Nicholas may interchangably mean either a mathematical unit or finite existence,
is the key to his thought and ultimately to his ideas on individuality.
Just as Nicholas accepts the existence of number, he accepts
the existence of reason for these two are interrelated.

Reason

is the individuating process which allows us to comprehend a
thing by perceiving its distinctiveness.

1

Number is necessarily

All references from De docta ignorantia are marked De d. ig.
and indicate the book and chapter.
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the tool of reason for we can only know a thing that is limited.
The reason gives names only to things which are capable of being
"more" or "less."

Everything knowable must exist as a limited

unit or number because it is by seeing agreement and distinction
of things that we become able to measure, and therefore form some
idea of both accidental and substantial existences (De d. ig.,
It is from thought that "all things receive limit and

I, i).

1
measure." Thus, reason can only operate because number exists
and number is understood only because there is reason.
It is possible for the intellect, using the facts which
reason has gathered from numbers, to draw analogies from which
it can establish some limited truths about the nature of the
Absolute (De d. ig., I, xi).

(In a later chapter the specifics

of Cusanus' epistomology will be examined.)

Number yields the

highest truths available to the human mind.

Nicholas establishes

his system entirely on the demonstrated mathematical analogies
which he draws from number.

He does not rely on Scripture or

authority to prove his arguments.

His references to Pythagoras,

Dionysius and those church fathers who honored number as a divine
tool for seeking the truth are used only as a sort of auxillary
support.
The first conclusion to be drawn from number is that knowledge is ignorance.

1

Reason can only apprehend that which is a

Cusanus, De mente, I.

9

number or finite unit because it knows only through a comparative
method of inquiry.

Something incapable of being "more" or "less"

cannot be compared and, therefore, cannot be understood.

The hu-

man mind cannot grasp something to which there is none other (�
aliud) and, consequently, can never possess the absolute truth
which is clearly incapable of being "more" or "less."

We cannot

measure the total truth which is one and indivisible just as "that
which is not a circle cannot be the measure of a circle, for the
nature of a circle is one and indivisible" (De d. ig., I, iii).
We can measure only number, and thus all we can ultimately affirm
is our own ignorance:

in the face of the totality of knowledge

we are like "owls trying to look at the sun."
total truth cannot know it.

We who are not the

This conclusion, however, does not

discourage Nicholas for he does believe that our ignorance can
become more and more learned and that we can draw closer and
closer to truth itself (De d. ig., I, iii).

Because we desire

truth, the intellect continues to draw analogies from number.
Number leads to the conclusion that the maximum truth,
which is the necessarily existing absolute maximum of being, is
the total of all that can be and that this totality must be both
infinite and One.

Number is finite and can always be added or

subtracted, so no number is capable of being the totality of all
because there could always be one more added.

Therefore, unity

at its absolute perfection cannot be a number or a plurality; it
must be One (De d. ig., I, v).

Numbers, however, do exist and

they necessarily proceed from something.

Their source must be
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infinite because that which is finite must ultimately have an
infinite first cause.
is infinite.

Numbers are relative to One which alone

As numbers must come from One, the infinite maxi-

mum, so must all finite creatures come from a Unity which is an
infinite One. The totality cannot be a plurality nor can the
source be finite.
Thirdly, number also leads us to the conclusion that the
Absolute Maximum is the Absolute Minimum.

Nicholas says:

By definition the minimum is that which cannot be
less than it is; and since this is also true of
the maximum, it is evident that the minimum is
identified with the maximum.
This becomes clearer when you restrict your con
siderations to the maximum and minimum of quantity.
The maximum quantity is infinitely great, whilst
the minimum is infinitely small. Now if mentally
you lay aside the notions of greatness and small
ness, you are left with the maximum and minimum
without quantity, and it becomes clear that the
maximum and the minimum are one and the same....
(De d. ig., I, iv)
In other words absolute quantity is both minimum and maximum because it is One.

Unity is both the smallest possible unit and

the totality of all.

Unity, or the totality of all as one, ne-

cessarily exists and cannot be more or less than it is or it is
not unity.

As unity it is simple--one as simple minimum and

simple maximum.
Not everyone is impressed with Cusanus' argument here.
Henry Bett especially criticizes this idea:
It does not seem to have occurred to Nicholas in
advancing this naive argument, that it is precis
ly quantity without which (according to his own
definition) the terms become simply meaningless.

11
It is like saying that black and red are really the
same, because if you think away colour, the terms
coincide....
The whole meaning of the term lies in the con
dition which he supresses--that the minimum is so
small that it cannot be less, and if it were greater
it would not be the least, and the maximum is so great
that it cannot be more, and if it were less it would
not be the greatest; and when once that essential is
expressed the terms cannot be changed. When you ex
press the character of the minimum by saying that it
cannot be more, you cannot apply that phrase to the
maximum .... The maximum and the minimum do not co
incide and cannot be made to appear to do so when
they are adequately defined.1
Although Nicholas may have violated the rules of defini
tion here, I think he would have been undaunted by this criticism.

He repeatedly stresses that we are unable to rationally

reconcile contradictories.

He is clearly aware of his problems

with definitions in dealing in areas where the intellect must
transcend the rational.

At one point he says that "understanding

of this matter will be attained rather by our arising above the
literal sense of the words, than by insisting on their natural
properties, for these properties cannot be effectively adapted
to such intellectual mysteries" (De d. ig., I, ii).

Later he

applies this to his specific use of "maximum" and "minimum":
In this book the terms maximum and minimum are
not restricted to quantity of mass or force;
they have an absolutely transcendent value
embracing all things in their absolute sim
plicity. (De d. ig., I, iv)
In answer to Bett, it must be said that Nicholas is forced into
using logically weak definitions and words outside of their
1

Bett, pp. 128-29.
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finite frame of reference because, he would say, there is no logical or finite way to understand the Absolute.

We are incapable

of grasping the truth because we are not the truth.

There can be

no understandable connection between the infinite and the finite
just as no progression of finite numbers can ever reach infinity.
This is the central problem expressed by his use of the words
"minimum" and "maximum"--how are we to explain the coincidence of
two opposites?

We accept that the absolute total of all is an

absolute maximum which must be a One.

One, however, is a minimum.

At the same time we rationally reject the idea that the totality
and source of all finite things can be infintesimally small and
utterly simple.

Yet we know from the study of number that this

must be, for we cannot deny the existence of number and thus cannot deny that it proceeds from something or that the totality of
all number would be a unity.

Number, finite and limited, must

have a beginning and an end, and this must be one and infinite.
The existence of the finite never alters the size of the ·one which
remains a maximum-minimum.

The term Absolute Maximum, which co-

incides with the Absolute Minimum, really expresses an undefinable
mystery incapable of normal definitions.
Cusanus expresses the impossible intellectual leap to this
mystery in many places.

He states that we can comprehend the

problem but can never know the answer.

In a passage from De

visione Dei he expresses this mystery:
Thou, my God, art Very Absolute Infinity, which
I perceive to be an end without an end, but I am
unable to grasp how without an end as end could
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be an end. Thou, God, art the End of Thine own
self, for Thou art whatever Thou hast; if Thou
hast an end, Thou art an End. Thou art therefore
an infinite End, because Thou art the End of Thine
own self. Since Thine end is Thine essence, the
essence of the end is not determined or ended in any
place other than the end itself. The end then which
is its own end is infinite, and every end which is
not its own end is a finite end. Thou, Lord, who art
the End ending all things art the End whereof there
is no end, or infinite. This eludeth all reason,
because it implieth a contradiction. Thus, when I
assert the existence of an end without an end, I
admit darkness to be light, ignorance to be knowledge,
and the impossible to be a necessity. Since we ad
mit the existence of an end of the finite, we needs
must admit the infinite, or the ultimate end, or the
end without an end. Now we cannot but admit the
existence of finite beings. Wherefore we cannot but
admit the infinite. Thus, we admit the coincidence
of contraries, above which is the infinite.1
Cusanus accepts the necessity of an unfathomable mystery at the
peak of human intellectual effort.

Number demonstrates this for

it teaches that the finite must have a source and end which must
be One and infinite.

Further, number teaches that the nature of

the infinite must be absolutely simple for if it were limited internally in any way it would necessarily have to proceed from a
higher, unlimited source, as the limited always comes from the
unlimited.

Thus, all opposites are reconciled in the pure sim-

plicity of One which holds within itself all without contradiction
or division.

By nature then the Absolute is a coincidentia-

oppositorium, rationally necessary and rationally impossible.
Having thus established that the Maximum is unfathomable,
1

cusanus, De visione Dei, trans. by J. Dolan in Unity and
Reform: The Selected Writings of Nicholas of Cusa (South Bend,
1962), p. 154.
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absolute simplicity and the maximum-minimum, Nicholas demonstrates
through number that this pure nature is necessarily triune.

Di

versity and inequality exist and give limitation to all things.
However, these necessarily are preceded by unity and equality.
Unity, which is the simple one, is infinite.

As unity necessarily

can have an equal, Equality must also be infinite.

As there is

a connection between these which is not caused by either of them,
the Connection must also be eternal.

But three eternals cannot

exist for plurality is preceded by unity (De d. ig., I, iv).
Therefore, the Absolute Unity, which is one, is three.
This is beyond understanding although we know that contradictories
are resolved in the ultimate Being which is incapable of "more"
or "less."

This conception of the Maximum is essential to

Nicholas' explanation of the universe.

Another important conclu

sion that can be seen equally fundamental to his thought is that
Unity (One) is the only entity which can have an equal.

All other

things are limited and unequal for the idea of equality implies
perfection and absoluteness, and these can only be attributes of
the infinite.

Everything else exists in limitation.

Thus all

finite things exist in degrees and are different from each other
even when the difference appears indiscernible.
As we have seen, Nicholas uses number as the best way to
reach the truths of which humans are capable.
number includes the mathematical figures.

The concept of

Removed as they are

from the senses, he feels that mathematical figures provide a
"more certain and solid knowledge" of divine truths (De d. ig.,
I, xi).

By establishing facts about these figures, he feels

15

that we can then apply analogies from them to the Absolute.

Al

though the actual demonstrations he gives may seem somewhat super
fluous as proofs for his conclusions, they demonstrate his method,
his fascination with number, and his assumption that the intellect
can achieve a higher plane of "knowing. "

Through drawings and

explanations he seeks to show a fundamental point--that if there
were an infinite line it would be at once a straight line, a
triangle, a circle and a sphere (De d. ig ., I, xiii).

For example,

he shows that if the angle of a triangle becomes greater and
greater it will eventually be 180

°

and become a simple line.

same is true if the arc of the circle is increased.

The

Therefore,

both the triangle and the circle are in essence a simple line.
However, the infinite line is also an infinite triangle for the
three sides of an infinite triangle must be infinite.

The three

infinite lines must be one line because it is impossible to have
an infinite plurality.

This is a "transcendental conclusion"

proving that the infinite triangle, as the perfect model triangle,
must have three lines but they must be resolved without contra
diction as one perfectly indivisible line (De d. ig., I, xiv).
Thus the infinite line is an infinite triangle and the infinite
triangle is an infinite line.

Similar arguments are used to show

that all the figures are in each other without confusion.
uses this model (De d. ig., I, xiii):

Cusanus
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By moving line A-B to C we get a triangle and by continuing we
get a circle.

The diameter B-D forms the perfect figure of the

sphere.
Whether these demonstrations are convincing or not; Nicholas
gathers information from the finite mathematical figures and
applies it first to the infinite forms of these figures and then
to the Infinite.

The qualities of the Infinite which he learns

in this way furnish the basis for his arguments and conclusions.
An example of the sort of truth he draws from the figures can be
seen in the infinite circle.

From the infinite circle we learn

that the center and the circumference of the Maximum are one and
the same.

If the circle is infinite, its diameter is also infin-

ite for any part of an infinite is infinite.

Therefore, the cen-

ter of the diameter is also infinite and as any part of an infin
ite is the same as any other part, the center, diameter and circumference of the infinite circle are one.

The conclusion we

learn is
that the Maximum, which is at once the Minimum,
is incomprehensible; and in it the centre is the
circumference.
You see how the minimum in its simplicity
and indivisibility is wholly and completely in
the midst of all, because it is the infinite
centre; how while outside all it encompasses all,
because it is the infinite circumference; how it
penetrates all because it is the infinite diameter.
(De Dig., I, xxi)
This conclusion later supports his reasoning that there is no
center to the universe and that all heavenly bodies move and
exist relative to each other.

In the same way, Cusanus takes

the infinite sphere, line and triangle to draw analogies about
the nature of the Absolute.

17

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the
figures is that the essence of each is identical.
other in a simple state.

All are in each

From this we learn that the essence of

all finite things is the same and comes from the undifferentiated
Maximum just as the essence of the finite line is from the infin
ite line which is the infinite circle, sphere and triangle.

While

each finite thing is distinct and unequal it receives its being
from the one absolute essence which is the simple Maximum.
Number is the tool of reason and Nicholas has used it to
draw his must basic conclusions about the nature of the Maximum
which is the source of all individual things.

Now it must be

seen how Nicholas views the nature of individual things and the
value that he gives to human existence and thought.

CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE
Nicholas of Cusa accepted the existence of the plurality of
finite things which are evident to us; this is the principle of
number.

But in what way do these individual things exist?

Do

they have actual existence or are they merely reflections or
shadowy developments from a higher Being?

It is important to

understand the nature of the reality of individual existence for
Cusanus to determine the implications for individuality in his
thought.

It is necessary to point out that Nicholas uses the

term "actual existence" for two distinct ideas.

He uses actualis

to refer both to the Absolute and to the individual in act.

These

are not distinguished, although he clearly intends different con
cepts, as the existence of the Absolute is prior to and the source
of the existence of individual things which are limited and contingent.
Cusanus states that logically we accept "the existence of
finite things, wherefore we cannot but accept the infinite," but
that we cannot know this Infinite because it is absolute Otherness.

1

Totally unlimited, it is the source and end of all be-

cause it is all.

Nicholas speaks of the explicato-complicatio

of God and, given this sort of Neoplatonist conception in which

1

De visione Dei, Dolan, p. 154.
18
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the creation is an outpouring and returning motion from a One,
we might expect of him an emanationist theory in which individual
things have the least reality as they are the farthest removed
from actual Being.

And indeed many times Nicholas stresses that

reality is in the Maximum in sentences like "The Maximum is the
infinite actual existence of all that is... " (De d. ig., I, xvi).
Further, he makes it clear that there can be no relationship between Reality and finite beings, just as we cannot explain any
connection between numbers and their unalterable source.

Yet,

while each creature neither augments nor diminishes the Absolute,
we know that each must be from and in it.

But do they have a

full reality?
Nicholas is not always clear in expressing in what way he
feels that things relate to God's reality.

At times he implies

that there is no true reality outside of God but only images
from Himself, the form of forms.

Creatures exist by the creative

movement of God's understanding and therefore:
A creature is not a positively distinct reality
that receives the image of the infinite form, it
is merely the image and nothing more, and in
different creatures we see accidentally different
images of that form. Since that is so, how is it
possible for us to understand that the various
creatures share in different ways the one infinite
form? It is as if a work of art were to have no
other being than that of dependence, and of total
dependence on the idea of the artist, from whom
it would receive its being and by whose power it

20

would be conserved in being, or it is like the
reflection of a face in the mirror, provided we
suppose that the mirror in and of itself is
nothing before or after the reflection.
( De d. ig., II, ii).
Thus, in one sense Cusanus is saying that the individual is not
"a positively distinct reality" but merely an image of actual
Reality upon whom it is entirely dependent.

All things exist as

different reflections of the ideas which exist in an undifferentiated state in one infinite form.

Individual things would thus

appear to have reality in only the most secondary way--as an
image created by the thought of God.
However, there can be no question that Cusanus accepts the
actual existence of the finite things of this world.

In fact the

key to his metaphysical system is the fact that only finite things
actually exist outside of the One.

His starting point may be

Neoplatonism but a sort of nominalism exerts itself and he ar
dently rejects emanationist theories.

Each thing is a part of

the explicato-complicatio of God but each is immediately from
God (De d. ig., II, v).

I think that by taking this position

Nicholas logically can protect, honor and demonstrate the abso
lute oneness of God and explain the direct infusion of the Word
into the universe.

In doing this, however, the individual takes

on a new and important position.

Thus, the nature of individual

existence is of the greatest significance in his system.
Fundamental to his conception of the nature of the individual existence is his rejection of any absolute outside of the
Undifferentiated Maximum.

He discusses the theories of the Stoics
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and Platonists that a Mind (or Soul of the World, or a Universal
Necessity) existed as an initial unfolding of the mind of God and
that within this Soul the forms of things had their true substan
tial existence "whereas in matter they are shadowy resemblances
without their original clarity" (De d. ig., II, ix).

The union of

the Soul of the World to possibility, which was some sort of formless potential, actualized a sensitive, rational form.

Possibility,

says Cusanus, was for the Platonists the matter of forms (De d. ig.,
II, viii).
them.

He presents all of these theories in order to reject

He shows that absolute possibility cannot exist outside

of the Absolute for if it is absolute it is incapable of degrees
and the only thing which cannot have degrees is the Maximum itself.
There can be only one infinite existence.

Therefore, the only un

limited possibility which can exist is absolute possibility which
must necessarily reside in the Infinite.

Absolute possibility can-

not exist independently even as a divine emanation.

In the same

way, nothing can exist in act in the world which is unlimited.
No being can exist which is not possible so all things are limited
in act by what is possible.

Matter needs form and form needs mat

ter in order to be (De d. ig., II, viii).

Act, therefore, receives

a limitation from possibility if it is to exist outside of God.
Unlimited act, which is infinite and absolute, can only be an
attribute of the One.

Absolute possibility and Absolute act re

side in infinite unity in the Maximum (De d. ig., viii and ix).
Nicholas feels that, by mutual contraction, possibility and
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act serve to limit each other and bring all things into existence.
The only unlimited existence, a maximum or a minimum, is One or
God.

The order in the world is provided by this co-limiting:
...if the possibility of things were not limited,
there could be no rational explanation of anything,
but all would be due to chance as Epicuras wrongly
maintained. In fact, the possibility of this
world was contracted to the aptitude to be this
world, and that necessarily was the reason why
this world from being possible was brought into
actual existence. The aptitude of the possibility,
then, was limited and not absolute. (De d. ig.,
II, viii).
Thus, Cusanus maintains strongly that possibility and act

do not exist as absolutes apart from God.

In the same way he

specifically rejects the existence of universals such as the genera
and species except as they pre-exist in the mind of God.

He states

that they can have no actual existence save by contraction in the
singular as the singular.

They are not in act and have no sub-

stance although "in the order of nature universals have a certain
universal being, which can be restricted by the individual... ''
(De d. ig., II, vi).

Universals therefore, though logically

prior to individuals, have no actual reality.

God is the entirely

absolute universal (Ibid.).
Thus only God and individual things have actual existence.
The universals are ideas in the mind of God and in human minds.
There is no series of descending emanations from Being down to
the lowliest farthest removed accidental reflection--a singular
thing.

Instead Cusanus says that the universe was one simple

emanation of a restricted maximum from the absolute maximum.
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Because all things must come from the Absolute Maximum and be
cause there are no absolutes outside of the Absolute, then the
universe, which is the maximum of all things, must be the equi
valent of the Absolute Maximum reproduced in the greatest possible,
although restricted, way (De d. ig., II, iv).
maximum but not the Maximum.

The universe is a

It is all things held in unity and

infinity but capable of plurality, composition, succession,
finiteness, etc.

Though the universe is one and maximal, it is

relative because its identity will be in diversity (Ibid.).

The

unity and quiddity of the universe comes from but "is infinitely
inferior to the pure unity of the Absolute" (De d. ig., II, iv).
As we have seen, Nicholas held that absolute Unity has a
threefold nature and it is this which accounts for the unity of
the universe.

Possibility (or contractibility) procedes from

the eternal unity.

A Jimiting principle comes from the equality

of unity--or this could be called the "equality of being" for
being and unity are convertible.

The limiting principle and

possibility are moved together by the eternal connection and to
gether produce actually existing individual things.
of course, this creative unity

lS

the Father, the Son (the Word

or the "motive, essence, archetype of things"
and the Holy Spirit.

For Nicholas,

(De d. ig.' II, vii)),

Without these three, potency, act and nexus,

the unity of the universe would be impossible.

In order to exist

the universe must be capable of contraction and contraction requires possibility (limited object), act (limiting principle)
and a connection (actual determination) (De d. ig., II, vii).
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Each individual thing is a direct contraction from unity
and not from a series of universals.

All things are in the All

and each thing is necessarily contracted from the All, though the
All is without plurality.
line to explain this idea.

Nicholas uses the example of the finite
The cause or source of the finite line

must be the infinite line and the infinite line contains within
it all the figures.

The figures are not actually present but are

in the line as the line itself.

Any segment of the infinite line

is, of course, infinite so all is within it but without plurality.
In the finite line which actually exists as an individual thing,
the all of the infinite line exists as that line itself (De d. ig.,
II, vii).

Each thing that exists in the universe comes from the

One which is All and in itself the all is itself as the contraction of possibility, form and movement.

Each comes from God

through the intermediary of the universe (De d. ig., II, v), and,
as each thing is a contracted all, then everything is in everything--guodlibet in guodlibet.

Nicholas says:

The universe is in each individual in such a
way that each individual is in it, with the
result that in each individual is by contrac
tion what that particular individual is; and
every individual in the universe is the uni
verse, though the universe is in each indi
vidual in a different way and each thing is
in the universe in a different way. (De d. ig.,
II, v)
One of Nicholas' most basic premises is thus that the indivictual existence--human, vegetable, etc.--must have its source
directly in the One without any intervening realities.

The finite

thing does not create itself, but in some unknowable way is
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contracted from the One which reveals itself in the visible ereation without altering its simple oneness.

In order to achieve

existence the individual thing must be limited, but its limited
ness is a limitation from the all without plurality, which is the
Absolute.

Thus, the essence or quiddity of all things is identi

cal (De d. ig., II, v), and all things are united for all is in
all and each is in each other.

However, this essence in the in-

dividual is a restricted quiddity and each is a distinct restric
tion:
No distinction can be made between the absolute
quiddity of the sun and the moon, for it is God
himself who is the absolute entity and quiddity
of all. But the restricted quiddity of the moon
is different from the restricted quiddity of the
sun, because the restricted quiddity of a thing
is the thing itself, whereas the absolute quiddity
is God and not the thing itself. (De d. ig., II, iv)
Thus, every existing thing is at once in its essence both God
and itself--and only itself.

Thus, as Socrates participates in

humanity but is not humanity--or the eye and hand are in the body
but are not the body--so does each individual thing participate
in the whole, forming the whole without being the whole.
In addition to his belief that individual things are the
only reality apart from the reality of the One and that each
thing is a contraction of that reality, Nicholas stresses the
uniqueness of each thing as is suggested in the quotation above.
Everything exists by limitation and therefore everything is ca
pable of degrees.

Although things exist as "an approximate re

production of the exemplar" none apart from the Examplar itself
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can be an image that rules out "the possibility of an infinity
of more faithful and precise images" (De d. ig., I, xi).

Each

thing has a singleness and a differentness which is its own and
"no matter how equal the measure and the thing measured are, they
will remain forever different" (De d. ig., I, iii).

Uniqueness

is maintained even within the genera and species where each re
poses "in its own weight, number and measure" and never absolutely
coincides with another.

All individuals are part of a continuum

of the species which shade off into each other (De d. ig., III, i).
Each member exhibits the nature of its own species to its own degree.

Nicholas insists on this singularity:
In the universe there is nothing that does not
enjoy a certain singularity that it shares with
no other. Nothing can prevail over all that is
in all things so as to turn their differences to
sameness, for never can complete sameness exist
in any two things. If at one time one thing is
smaller and at another time larger than another,
throughout the change it preserves its singularity
so that never does it pass through a moment of
exact equality. (De d. ig., III, i)

As the genera and species gradually coincide, they never reach
a moment of equality between individuals.

Existence is possible

because of the limiting or individuating principles, and thus
every degree is possible between the maximum and minimum of being
but no finite thing can reach a maximum or minimum of a species
because this would imply a perfection or equality of degrees
which is impossible outside of the absolute (De d. ig., III, i
and ii).
That individuals are immediate and unique creations from
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God's essence is basic to Cusanus' other premise about the nature
of individual existence:
ity.

all things exist in a state of relativ-

As we have seen, each individual thing is created through a

relative and unique combination of potency, act and nexus.

More-

over, each thing is also conditioned by every other existing thing.
There are no absolutes in the universe.

For example, absolute

white or absolute heat can exist outside the Absolute only in
degrees which will coincide in individual things with non-whiteness
or cold.

Because everything that exists outside of the One is

limited, it must be in a structural as well as in an essential
relationship.

The precision of these relationships is as amazing

to Cusanus as their existence is necessary.

He discusses, for

example, the relativity of the elements:
He allotted its parts that there should be no more
earth in the earth than water in the water, than air
in the air or fire in the fire, so that no element
could be wholly transmuted into another; whence it
comes that the physical system cannot sink into
chaos. Some of the elements may be transformed
into another, but (for example) the air which is
mingled with water can never all be changed into
water, the surrounding air preventing this; it is
this transmutability that makes possible the mingling
of the elements. Nevertheless, God has so arranged
it there should be transmutation of the elements;
and when this takes place successively there is
brought into existence a new thing which endures
in being as long as the agreement of the elements
remains. If the agreement is broken, the new
substance disappears. (De d. ig., II, xiii)
Nicholas sees that modes of existence disappear but this is no
more than the resolution of a composite into its elements (De
d. ig., II, xii).

Thus, individuals, things and the elements

which comprise them are in a continuous state of relativity.
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Nor is there anything in the cosmos which is not relative.
Something in the universe may appear to be the center or zenith
but this is so only because of the relative position of the
viewer (De d. ig., II, xi).

There can be no material center of

the universe £or no absolute can exist outside of God and there
fore no absolute point of rest is the center of the universe.
All movements in the universe have degrees and influence every
other movement.

God describes the limits of the universe and in

Him the center and circumference are one, £or every part of an
infinite is infinite and therefore the same.

Thus everything in

the universe exists only in relativity (De d. ig., II, xi).

The

stars act and react upon each other and this is equally true of
all movements on earth.

The earth itself is not the center of

the universe but a star "having a light, heat, influence distinc
tively its own" and as a consequence of realizing its own exis
tence, it communicates to other stars in the same way that light
gives light by its nature, but as a consequence of being itself,
it enables seeing (De d. ig., II, xii).
These then are the basic ideas which Nicholas had about the
nature of the existence of individual things.

Each shares the

absolute essence of the One but each as a unique contraction of
possibility and act.

Each is designed to fulfill its own exis

tence and as it does so, it is acted upon and acts upon every
other thing so that all together participate in the structure of
the whole.

All things are conditioned if they are to have exis

tence, and it is this limitation which causes both their individuality and their relativity.
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Thus, we see that Nicholas viewed the nature of individual
existence as being directly from God, utterly unique and com
pletely relative.

This attitude was the logical corollary to his

conception of the Infinite One, the necessarily existing maximum
Truth and Being, as the absolute totality and the absolute cause
of all that is.

In analyzing the implications of Nicholas'

thoughts on individuality it seems that perhaps the most signifi
cant idea is the inextricable mix of individuality and relativity.
Because there are no absolutes, everything is relative and reality
can only exist in the individual things that are in act.

Rela

tivity itself, however, is maintained by the structure and func
tioning of the individual existences.

This duality gives to

Nicholas' individual both an importance and a humility.

First of

all there is something remarkable in seeing each thing in the
universe as a unique contraction of the essence of God.

A human

individual can exult in his uniqueness and significance, yet this
view is mitigated by the knowledge that every other thing is
equally unique and significant.

A sort of equality of inequality

arises for although everything exists in degrees each is an individual and as essentially divine as any other.

Secondly, while

individuals are the expression of reality, this state exists because of the interaction of all the forms of existence.

Individ-

uality seems somewhat tenuous and dependent; its reality is finite
and relative, a notch in a continuum of being.

Lastly, indiv

iduals take on great value in Nicholas' system because universals
and hierarchies are not actual realities.

There is nothing
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between God and a finite existence that is more real or valuable.
The individual is not at the bottom of a series of emanations.

�

Moreover, in Nicholas' view of the centerless universe in which
the earth moves and interacts with all the other stars, the individual is no longer at the bottom of a heavenly hierarchy.

In this

way, Nicholas establishes that individuals-are not only essentially
and functionally significant, they are the highest expression of
reality and the relative center of the universe.

No matter what

universals will be framed in the mind or what inequalities will
be found to exist among humans, at least no individual is in
herently less significant than any other person, idea or thing
on a scale of being or within the universe.

Once again, while

Nicholas grants to the individual this status, it is conditioned
by the fact that while there is no inferiority there is also no
superiority.

Individuality in Nicholas' system is a positive

value, an expression of the being of God, but it only exists in
a relative state and it is shared equally in the sense of essence
and involvement with the whole by every other finite existence.
Thus his system implies the inherent equality of all individuals
and their primary place in reality.
It should be noted that Nicholas' metaphysical view of in
dividual reality and relativity have been considered some of his
most innovative conceptions.

For example, from an historical

perspective Nicholas is seen to have brought about "the radical
divorce of individual and essence."

1

This is because his doc-

trine of the unity of essence implies that things exist by their
1
Thomas McTighe, "Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz's Principle
of Indiscernibility," Modern Schoolman, XLII (November 1964), 44.
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differences.

In addition, some scholars feel that he was the first

thinker to express the "structuralist" view of the universe when
he emphasized the function of the Trinity rather than its sub
stance.

The resulting tendency is to see reality in terms of

transcendental structures (functions and relations) instead of
substance.

It is with Cusanus, says Jasper Blystone in his ar-

ticle "ls Cusanus the Father of Structuralism?" (Philosophy Today,
1972), that the idea that "no moment can be conceived autonomously"
1
first appeared in history.

Nicholas' ideas on relativity are

considered by various scholars to have anticipated or influenced
.

.

.

developments in philosophy, ph ysics, calculus and astronomy.

2

Nicholas, whatever his influence, insists on the reality
and relativity of individual existence.

It remains to be seen

if human existence is significant or superior in any way.

1

Jasper Blystone, "Is Cusanus the Father of Structuralism?"
Philosophy Today, 16 (1972), 303.
2

For examples see Dolan, 2.P.· cit., introduction; McTighe,
2.P.· cit., and A. J. Crombie, A History of Medieval Science (New
York, 1959).

CHAPTER IV
THE NATURE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE AND THOUGHT
For Cusanus, each individual thing in the universe is a
unique contraction of the absolute essence, existing in a relation
ship with every other £act of the universe.
essence no thing is superior to any other.

Therefore, in its
As Cusanus stresses

this "admirable equality and wonderful unity of things" (De d. ig.,
II, v), it must be asked if he finds human existence more significant than that of a radish, a bird or a star.

In order to show

that Nicholas thought that humanity is the highest form of exis
tence, it would have to be demonstrated that he accepted a hier
archy of being.

Even then, if human individuality is to be of

any positive value, individuals would have to be able to think
and operate with some degree of initiative and independence.

It

is indeed Nicholas' conception that humanity is the highest form
of finite being as a result of its capability for thought, and
that its thought is of an active and positive nature.
In his metaphysic Nicholas establishes that humans are the
highest form of being outside of the Absolute through the following
arguments.

We have already seen that he denies the existence of

reality to any intermediaries between the Maximum and the being
of individuals.

In the visible creation, however, he assumes a

scale of being.

Although he stresses that each thing is perfect

in its own existence, striving to fulfill its own nature, and
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contributing harmoniously to the whole (De d. ig., II, v), this
basic (essential) equality is necessarily manifested in degrees
of being because nothing can exist which is not capable of being
"more" or "less."
for the One.

Equality and absoluteness are possible only

The way in which the degree of being that a thing

possesses is measured is through comparing it with the Maximum
because the Maximum is total Being.

Thus, the more similar a

thing is to the Maximum, the more it participates in actual exis
tence or reality.

Cusanus illustrates this through number.

The

measure of the curve is the straight line because the maximum and
minimum curve is a straight line.

The measure of the straight

line is the infinite line, so the curve's relationship to the in
finite line is measured by its similarity to the finite line.

It

thus has a secondary relationship because "the finite line by
reason of its straightness, enjoys a more direct and immediate
participation in the infinite, whereas the curve's participation
is rather remote and mediate" (De d. ig., I, xiii).

Through this

example Cusanus illustrates that substances reflect grades of
accidents and degrees of participation.
Applying this to existing things, Nicholas says that beings
exist by degrees and these degrees reflect the grade of their
participation in the Infinite, who as the Unity and Reality of
all is the Measure of all.

Thus, the more immediately a creature

is like God the more it partakes of being and the higher its na
ture.

For Cusanus the nature of God is Thought which means that

the measurement of the degree of being is the degree of thought.

34

God is the totality of all possible thoughts and is the source of
all images which reflect his nature in varying ways:
Thus the creatures devoid of thought are less
images than developments of the divine simpli
city, although according to the brightness of
the thought which shows in their development
itse�f_and w?ich i� the image_itself, _they
1
participate in varied manner in that image.
Thought itself is manifested in various levels of which the highest
is the intellectual.

The only creatures which achieve this in

tellectual being are humans who can thereby apprehend the creative
thought of God (De d. ig., II, vi; III, iii).

A passage in De

sapientia illustrates Cusanus' idea that being is scaled in terms
of participation in thought or Wisdom.

The simple nature of the

infinite communicates itself in finitely good but diverse ways:
Wisdom being in diverse forms is diversely received.
Thus it is that every form called to identity is a
partaker of Wisdom in so far as it can. Some of the
participants hardly receive more than an elementary
being, others more nobly fashioned are vegetable life,
still higher sensible life, the scale then leads to
imaginative power, then a rational, and finally an
intellectual life. This latter is the highest level
2
and it is nearest the image of wisdom.
Humans are the only creatures with intellectual life and are,
therefore, the most noble of the species.

Individual things in

Cusanus' thought are not the last development on a descending
scale of reality in which they are separated from the One by innumerable intervening universals and accidents.

1

De mente, IV

2
De sapientia, Dolan, p. 155.

Each is immediately
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from the One and is actually real.

However, within the visible

creation things reflect the image of God in varying degrees and
the most like God, the most real, are those with intellect.
Humans, as the creatures with intellect, have the highest
place in the hierarchy of being.

However, it needs to be seen

if the operation of this intellect is of any value or merely the
movement of pre-impregnated images.
the finite mind and its operation?

How then did Nicholas view
First of all, he teaches that

if all things are contractions from God then our minds are con
tracted forms of God's mind and thus latently contain all possible
ideas:
You know how the divine simplicity envelops all
reality. Thought is the image of this envelopIf one calls this infinite sim
ing simplicity.
plicity an infinite thought one considers it as the
very model of our thought. And if one affirms that
the divine thought is the total truth of things,
one says of our thought that it is the total
assimilation of things since it contains the to
tality of notions. For the infinite thought to
conceive things, it is the same as to produce
them. For us, it is to have of them only the no
tion.
If the infinite thought is absolute, it is
sufficient for it to conceive beings in order to
create them, while if our thought conceives them
it is contente to assimilate them.
All things are in God, but as models. All
things are in our thought, but as images. As
God is absolute being, enveloping all being,
thus our thought is the image of that infinite
being.1
The human mind is a contraction of the infinite mind and,
therefore, of all possible ideas.

1

De mente, III.

Nicholas also thinks that as
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a contraction of the Mind the finite mind will have the power to
function in an active and creative way.

The mind of God includes

at once intelligible being, intelligible object and the act of
understanding (De d. ig., I, x).

The human mind, therefore, has

self-awareness, comprehendible concepts and the ability to move
itself to achieve understanding.

This is a crucial concept for

Cusanus who stresses that the image of God (Wisdom) in man is
"the living intellectual life whose power consists in being able
by itself to exercise a motion whereby it advances by understanding
1
to its proper object, absolute truth or eternal wisdom.

It would

seem that there are two causes of this ability of the mind to operate itself.

Because it is modeled on God's mind, it is a func-

tioning process, although assimilative rather than creative.

Sec-

ondly, as one of God's works it moves to fulfill the existence
given to its particular nature.

Nicholas says that all things

receive the abilities needed to be themselves, and these are all
they desire to be (De d. ig., I, i).

Because knowledge is the

life or existence of the intellect, it receives a natural movement which ceaselessly desires truth (De d. ig., I, i).
Thus we see that as a contraction of infinite thought the
mind contains all possible notions and the ability to think or
understand.

The notions which it contains are not apparent to

the mind unless it chooses to move toward understanding:

.
.
1
De sapientia, Dolan, p. 15 6 . (my italics)
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Only that which is already in the intellect
and by contraction in the intellect can be
understood. By the act of understanding,
therefore, it develops by means of similar
characteristics and properties a world of
resemblances which exists in it by con
traction. (De d. ig., II, vi)
The mind must actively observe and analyze the natural world in
order to form or comprehend that which is inherent in the under
standing.

Nothing can be conceived which is not in the mind of

God and thus contracted into the human mind, yet no fact or image
is available without effort on the part of the mind.

Thus, Nicholas

thinks that human minds are neither blank slates upon which information is absorbed, nor is it a form of memory, but, rather, they
are microcosms of the mind of God which are capable of acting to
achieve comprehension of the self, the world, and the One.
The actual operation of the mind is seen by Cusanus as a
three-fold process.

The mens is comprised of the senses, the

reason and the intellect which have separate names and powers
but are also a unity as they each co-penetrate the others.

1

The

senses are basic to the operation of the mens for without them
no images could be formed (De d. ig., I, xi).

Although their in

formation is the least reliable because it is about fluctuating
things, without the medium of the senses which transmit stimuli
there would be nothing in reason (Nihil in ratione, guod pruis
2
non fuerut in sensu). The need for sensory information is the
1

De mente, XI, and De coniecturis, II, xiv.

2
De mente, II.
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reason that we have bodies.

The reason works through its creature,

number, by classifying and naming things.

Cusanus holds that

thought is measure and says in Idiota that the word mens is re
lated etymologically to metari because it is the nature of thought
(reason) to impose limits and give names in order to comprehend
the natural world.

1

Later in the same work he says that "the role

of numbers is to discern the common realities, at first confounded,

2
.
.
to synthetically reassemble the nature of things."

As the senses furnish information to the reason, so does
the reason serve the third element of the�• the intellect.
It is the intellect which distinguishes man from all other crea
tures and makes him capable of reaching a higher level of truth
within the limits of his finite potential.

The intellect, how-

ever, needs the reason to gather the facts from which it can form
higher truths:
Consider therefore reason itself not as a
root bedded in the body, but as the mid-point,
through which the root of the intellect
descends into the body, for it is the in
strument of the intellect and, moreover the
foundation or instrumental root of corporeal
knowledge.3
The intellect descends into the reason but it then proceeds
to work at levels higher than the distinguishing and comparing

1
2
3

.
I.
Ibid.,
Ibi·ct., X.
.

.

..

De coniecturis, I, vii.
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faculties of reason can go.

Reason allows understanding of the

material world by individualizing things based on sensory infor
mation.

The intellect, however, wishes for truths that are not

dependent on the material world which is ever changing.

Nicholas

says, "the more we abstract from sensible conditions the more certain and solid our knowledge is" (De d. ig., I, xi).

The intellect

takes the information from reason and moves beyond it.

This makes

it possible for the intellect to accept what reason denies.

For

example, the reason cannot accept the coincidence of a line and
a triangle, but it is easy for the intellect to do so (De d. ig.,
I, xiv).

The intellect sort of recombines the distinctions made

by the reason.

The intellect can accept that there is at some

point a coincidence of opposites, which appears absurd to reason.
In fact the intellect abstracts the "immutible quiddities" of
things, including its own immutability, and comprehends through
1
its own efforts that all is ultimately one and simple.

The in

tellect can enfold as One (complicativa) all things which exist
in their unfolding (explicatione) as incompatible opposites be.

.

.

cause its own nature is the simple unity.

2

The aspect of the intellect which allows the mind to re
concile opposites and reach a high level of thought is often re£erred to by Nicholas as the intuition.

1

Ibid., and De mente, III.

2

De coniecturis, II, ii.

Intuition is possible

40

because it is both independent and dependent.

In its action it

turns itself and yet this would not be possible if it were not
made in God's image.

It is intuition which manifests the highest

thought:
Universal intuition surpasses all relatively
determined necessity, since it is applied to
the truth stripped of all variation, in abso
lute necessity, of absolutely simple form,
without number, without size, without any
sort of alteration. Now, if thought uses
itself for this superior mode of intuition,
it is because it is the image of God and as
God, who is all, it manifests in itself, at
the moment when it turns toward its model
as such, that living image of God, in an
effort of all its being in order to be
assimilated to Him.1
We see here that Nicholas feels that thought uses its superior
mode when it wishes to turn itself to the truth and that this is
possible because it is modeled on the infinite.
The intellect is aware that it has this relationship with
the One and that through intuition it "contemplates not only all
as being one but itself as being the actively assimilated image
of that one."

(Et hoc modo intuitur omnia unum et se illius

2
assimilationem, per quam notiones facet de uno, quod omnia). In

addition, the intellect is aware of its own limitations, including
the limits of the sensory and the rational.

It knows that it can

never achieve the full truth for it is not the truth and because

1

De mente, VII.

2
De coniecturis, I, vii.
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there is no progression from the finite to the infinite.

While

conscious of its own power of assimilation and active thought,
it knows that all the conclusions it reaches can only be relatively true.

In spite of the limits of the intellect, Cusanus

does not emphasize this negative idea but praises the admirable
power of our thought.

1

The intellect is the glory of man be-

cause it is immutable, above time, and "unsubjected to temporal
conditions, for by its nature it embraces within itself the incorruptible forms" (De d. ig., III, x).

Nicholas believes that,

while our knowledge can only be ignorance, it can always be "more
true" and then, as we grope in the dark, "our ignorance will en
lighten us in an incomprehensible fashion and enable us to form
a more correct and truer notion of the Absolute (De d. ig., I, xii)."
How does the mind approach the problem of achieving learned
ignorance which brings it closer to truth?

Nicholas describes

a three-fold process which requires the efforts of the senses,
reason and intellect.

The truth is found by drawing analogies

from number:
In mathematics we are always dealing with finite
things, for if they were not finite we could form
no idea of them at all. If then we want to reach
the Absolute Infinite through the finite, we must
in the first place study finite mathematical fi
gures as they are, namely a mixture of potency and
act; then we must attribute the respective perfec
tions to the infinite figures, and thirdly we must,
in a much more sublime way, attribute the perfections

1

De mente, IV.
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of the infinite figures to the simple infinite,
which cannot possibly be expressed by any figure.
(De d. ig., I, xii)
The senses and reason distinguish the figures; the intellect gives
them their higher meaning and recognizes that it cannot express
their ultimate simplicity.

The mind goes to this effort because

it desires truth and because it is contracted truth.

By acting

with itself as instrument, the mind uncovers what was inherent in
it.
It should perhaps be re-emphasized that for Nicholas the
mind, operating at the level of intellect, is what makes human
ness, and as the intellect is the image of God, human thought is
the soul.

The soul and intellect are "one in the sense that in

the animal the sensitive power of the eye is compounded with the
visual power."

1

The goals of the soul and the intellect are one:

reunion with their source through knowledge.

The being of the

intellect is knowledge or truth, so that the more it strives to
know, the more it can be. (De d. ig., III, ix).

Unless it seeks

to know, the intellect-soul dies for knowledge is its being, and
therefore, there is death to that which makes a man what he is.
Thus, for Cusanus, the purpose and natural desire of the intellect
is the pursuit of the highest or religious truths.

After death

our learned ignorance will become certain knowledge and this will
bring an indescribable and eternal joy.

1 . .
Ibid., I.

Salvation will be the
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intellectual satisfaction which gives fulfillment to our godlike
natures.

Then the "whole man becomes his intelligence which is

spirit and his body (still truly a body) is absorbed into the
spirit" (De d. ig., III, ix).

It is through the intellect, which

is one with the spirit and soul and which is modeled on the In
tellect, that we can seek God if we wish, can learn about Him and
ultimately find Him.
when he is in God.

The human intellect is God in man and man
The emphasis on the idea of intellect in

Cusanus--its power, potential and religious significance--cannot
be overestimated.
We see from this outline of Nicholas' epistomology that he
views humans as the highest reality in the universe because they
possess intellect and this intellect operates under its own power
to discover this world and the One.

A contraction of the mind of

God, it can operate and know, in a limited way, like its Source,
just as the finite line finds its source and characteristics in
the infinite line.

Thus the human mind is capable within limits

of understanding and creating.

The mind, holding within it the

inherent images which make understanding possible, is the source
of all the arts and inventions.

All of this reflects Nicholas'

extremely positive attitude toward the human mind.

Possessed

with this powerful tool, man can surely face the world with selfconfidence.

It is man's mind, the greatest actual existence,

which conveys a quasi-existence on the universals and other na
tural laws.

He naturally pursues and applies knowledge.

This

optimistic attitude is seen in this defense of the status of the
earth among other inhabited planets:
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Now, even if inhabitants of another kind should
exist in the other stars, it seems inconceivable
that in the line of nature anything more noble
and perfect could be found than the intellectual
nature that exists here on this earth and its
regions. (De d. ig., II, xii)
It is possible to conclude from Nicholas' ideas that he feels
the human intellect is godlike and, therefore, creative, active,
and noble.

His conception stresses this positive view at all

times:
Man is God, but not absolutely, because as
man, he is thus a human god. Man is also the
universe, but he is not concentratedly every
thing, because he is man, Man is thus a mic
rocosm or a human universe. In the region it
self of humanity, thus, its power includes god
and the whole universe.1
The implications of Nicholas' views on human existence and
thought support and enhance his ideas on individuality.

His meta-

physic emphasized the reality of any individual existence by eliminating the actual existence of universals or emanations.

Without

any realities between God and the visible world, the only reality
which can be understood or studied is the finite.

The human mind

stands at the top of the hierarchy of finite being.

It is not a . ,

mirror for ideas but an active agent comprehending reality and
forming the universals, which it is able to do because of its
godlike nature.

If the human mind, operating at the level of

intellect, is thus free (relatively) and noble, then so is man
because the being of man is his intellect.

1

.

.

De coniecturis, II, xiv.

The individual in

•
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Cusanus' scheme would be interested in this world, mostly because
the finite reality yields knowledge from which to draw analogies
about infinite reality.

The individual recognizes both his ca

pabilities and his limitations and would see himself as the high
est form of finite life.
This positive tone in Nicholas' attitude toward individuals
is unvarying.
writing.

It is underscored by the enthusiastic tone of his

It is assumed by him that the inherent drive of the in-

tellect for knowledge of the infinite is so pervasive that it is
a consistent and pervasive passion for all.

The idea that his

own metaphysic would tend to prove that this drive would exist by
degrees, thus allowing for evil, disinterest, stupidity, etc.,
does not concern him.

Such intellects will suffer intellectual

death which is real death, but this idea is mentioned only in
passing because for Nicholas it is evidently almost unbelievable
that any intellect would so violate its god-given nature which is
to seek knowledge.

The intellectual drive is not a matter of de

grees then for Nicholas and each individual seeks to fulfill its
nature totally.

Capacity may vary but not desire.

It also does not seem to bother Nicholas that each indiv
idual must accept that his view of the truth will always be con
ditioned.

He insists in fact that absolute truth is unknowable,

and that the limited truth ascertained by an intellect is only
one view.

For example, he says in De visione Dei that a lion

would see God as a lion.

Thus the individual for Cusanus may

feel that his intellect's grasp of the Infinite and his ideas
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in general are as legitimate as anyone else's, for they come from
a contraction of the infinite, yet he must also accept the validity
of every other.

If all the truth we can ever know is relative,

even a relative view of the truth can only be relative.

(Nicholas

seems inconsistent here for he uses his arguments about our re
lative knowledge of the ultimately unknowable truth to support
what he considers to be the absolute truth.)

While the limits of

knowledge might disconcert some, this problem of the relativity
of our knowledge never discourages Nicholas.

The intellect con

tinues to pursue learned ignorance, accepting its limited power
but enthusiastically confident that it is drawing ever closer to
the Unknowable.
The individual human for Cusanus is a wonderful creation.
Using the Platonist conception of microcosm, he emphasizes in
dividualness by stressing that each is the highest form of reality,
utterly unique and capable of freely thinking and acting.

The

entire tone of Nicholas' writings adds to this feeling of JOY in
the potential of individuals to understand and to draw closer to
the Absolute.

CHAPTER V
THE INDIVIDUAL IN CUSANUS' RELIGIOUS THOUGHT
The specifically religious thought of Nicholas of Cusa re
flects his positive and optimistic attitude toward the individual
and emphasizes the personal experience of God.

This is seen in

his views of human nature and salvation, in his mysticism and in
his comments on the role of the Church.
First of all, Nicholas' theology is rooted in his metaphys
ical perception of human nature.

He demonstrates that the essence

of the universe is humanity and, of course, humanity exists only
in individuals.

This ennobling view of human nature is taught by

Nicholas in order to explain that salvation can only come through
Christ.

Because of his metaphysical system, he can show that the

universal limited maximum must be human nature at its maximum perfection:

Jesus.

He arrives at this by explaining that no indiv-

idual member of a species can be the maximum of the species for
this individual member would then have to possess all the poten
tials and unlimited perfections of the entire species.

This is

not possible for a finite creature (De d. ig., III, iii).

Neither

can a finite creature be the equal of any other member of his
species because equality lacks degrees and creatures can only
exist by degrees.

Any maximum member of a species is necessarily

an absolute and incapable of being "more" or "less."
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The maximum
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member of any species would have to possess all the possibilities
of all the other genera and species and would thus have to be the
absolute maximum (De d. ig., III, iii).
However, says Nicholas, if such a creature were to exist
who possessed all the possibilities of limited existence, it would
have to fulfill two necessary qualifications.

First, it would

have to be a member of the species which "would exhibit itself as
the fullest perfection of the universe and every individual in
it" (De d. ig., III, iii).

This species would have to be the

species of man £or it is human nature which "is raised above all
the works of God, and made a little lower than the angels" (Ibid.).
The second qualification £or this maximum individual would require
that the maximum of the species would have to be a single member
of this species of man because humanity exists only when contracted
in individuals.

This maximum human individual would then be "the

universal contracted entity of each creature through his union
with the absolute, which is the absolute entity of all things."
(Ibid.) This person is the limited maximum, contracted from the
absolute.

As the highest equality existing without degree it is

the Word itself.

(The words "Jesus," "God," "limitability" or

act, "Equality" and "universe" seem to be used interchangably in
Cusanus even though at times he is trying to describe distinctions
in their essential oneness.)
All the points so carefully established by Nicholas about
the triune nature of the simple Maximum, the degrees of finite
creatures, the common essence of all things and the impossibility of
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absolutes outside of God are all brought together to confirm that
Jesus is the Word.

He shows that the Maximum Creature must be

the Absolute Universal or the Form of forms.

Conversely he shows

that the Absolute Universal must be the perfect human individual
which as the highest species summarizes all the possibilities of

1
other life. Thus, he says, "God Himself would by this assumed

humanity become all things in their limitation in that humanity"
(De d. ig., III, iii).

He explains this order while stressing

that it is not temporal for it transcends time:
First then, stands God the creator. Next is
God and man, whose created humanity has been
assumed into the most intimate possible union
with God, and, as being the universal limita
tion of all things, is hypostatically and per
sonally united with the absolute power behind
the being of all things, that he may exist by
the most absolute God through the universal
limitation, which is humanity. In the third
place all things are in their limited being,
so that what they are they might be in a still
better order and manner (De d. ig., III, iii).
Jesus, humanity at its perfection, is also the limited maximum and is therefore the link between the finite and the infinite.
Therefore, the essence of the universe is Jesus who is maximum
humanity, which means the essence of the universe is humanity:
In all things and all in Him, God is there
without any variation of his absolute power
to create, in unity with the maximal humanity
of Jesus; in Him the maximal man cannot exist
except in the maximal fashion. Jesus is thus
the absolute creative power of God and in Him
1
Books I and II of De docta ignorantia are a preparation
for the demonstrations of Book III.
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as in the Son, the middle person, the eternal
Father and the Holy Spirit dwell. All things
are in the Word; in that most high and most per
fect human nature which mightily embraces all
createable beings, all things exist that all
fullness may dwell in Him. (De d. ig., III, iv)
We see here Nicholas' high regard for human nature.

Man is essence,

his contracted self is God and the essence ·of God is humanity.
The critical point in his religious scheme is not the question of
why God took human form, but the fact that humans are contractions
of the divine and link themselves to the infinite through the maximally perfect man who is God.

He says, "Human nature is the one

essential element in the universe, without which it would be nei
ther perfect nor even a universe, and hence, if time stopped, it
would be necessary for men to rise to incorruption, if the whole
universe is not to perish."

(Only man needs to rise because he

is the perfection of all other animals,) (De d. ig., III, iv).
This view of the essential humanness of the universe is hardly a
discouraging notion to individuals.

Humans are not degraded in

this religious view but elevated by their natures.
Secondly, the natural corallary to this divine nature of
man, Nicholas accentuates the quality of human individuals by
omitting any discussion of evil.

He acknowledges that passions

and temporal desires exist as a result of man's carnal birth but
he also mentions that sensory experience is necessary to man's
functioning on earth.

Moreover, the senses are supposited in his

incorruptible intellectual nature and are controlled by the reason.
This allows man to pursue the spiritual aspirations of his real
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nature which is intellectual.

Nicholas says that "man is his

intelligence" (De d. ig., III, iv) because man is a limitation
of the essence of Jesus and the essence of Jesus is intellect-the divine intellect which is the totality or perfection of thought.
The emphasis is always on the nobility and intellectual as
pects of �an.

Cusanus is not interested in the existence of evil

or in explaining it.

Suffering, disease, sin, cruel aberrations

in nature and human nature are ignored in this system which so
praises the divine origin and goal of the human intellect or hu
man nature.

The emphasis is always positive and there is a tone

of joy when he discusses the intellect's final union with Christ.
Because maximal man rose above finiteness, all men rose for they
are all in human nature.

Those men who have united their natures

as much as possible with the intellectual nature of Christ will
receive eternal life which is the knowledge of all which the in
tellect has so ardently desired to know.

For those intellects

who have denied their nature (that is, intellect) damnation is
the denial of knowledge and hence death and suffering.

It is

man's wonderful human nature, which is the intellect or soul at
its purest levels of thought, which can bring him this incompre
hensible and unending joy (De d. ig., III, vi).

While it is clear

in his theology that those who deny Christ for any reason will not
be able to fulfill their natures, the main idea is that it can be
done and that the individual can intellectually will to do so.
Cusanus' view of human nature and salvation are positive in every
sense of the word.

His few remarks about temporal and "down-
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dragging" desires are perfunctory and traditional.

This allows

him to give a very neat and antiseptic explanation of the universe
and the Faith which seems somewhat inadequate.

The overall tone

is so optimistic that it could only have encouraged his readers
to honor their own natures and wills.
A third point to be made about Cusanus' theology is that he
strongly stresses the individualness of faith and the resurrection.
Individuality continues even after physical death.

This is, of

course, traditional Christian thinking, but nevertheless it should
be noted that he is particularly careful to point out that the in
dividual's uniqueness remains intact even in total union with the
One.

To have full existence a person must reach for this full en

velopment with Being and yet must remain himself.

Of the indiv

idual's relationship with Christ, Nicholas says that ''none sub
sists in himself apart from this union, nor does the union destroy the individual's degree" (De d. ig., III, xii).
are numerically distinct and will remain so.

Individuals

The person's body

will exist after the end of time but it will then be of an incor
ruptible nature and it will be absorbed into the intellect as here
the intellect is in the body (De d. ig., III, x).

A person be

comes his intellect after death because this is his true nature
and because he no longer needs mental pictures to be furnished
him by the senses and reason (De d. ig., III, vii).

Thus, indiv-

iduality is the only mode of true existence outside of the Abso
lute and its distinction will remain forever intact.
Another way in which Nicholas' religious thought enforces
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the positive concept of individuality can be ascertained in his
mysticism.

Although he expresses only the most orthodox views

about the resurrection, judgment and salvation by faith, he seeks
God beyond reason.

Reason has shown us this fact by teaching

that any name given to something restricts it.

As the absolute

is beyond restriction it cannot be contrasted, compared or dis
tinguished and, therefore, can be neither named nor known.

If

names are given to God, it limits Him and tends to make Him to be
like a creature.

To avoid this anthropomorphism, Nicholas says

that positive theology needs the presence of negative theology
which teaches that God is ineffable, incomprehensible and known
only to Himself (De d. ig., I, xxvi).
If God cannot be known by reason, then for Nicholas the on
ly way to know (taste, se�, feel, etc.) Him is to transcend the
rational order.

Only the intellect can do this for it is above

reason and it is an incorruptible contraction of the Intelligence.
The action of the intellect is supra-temporal (De d. ig., III, ix).
It can never change itself into eternal things but it can be
transformed by degrees to be like eternal things and thus be freed
of the temporal (De d. ig., III, ix).

This transformation comes

when a person loves God which is to "journey towards Him in spir
itual movement" (Ibid.).

Negative theology says that the indiv

idual becomes most real the more he unites with ultimate reality
and he achieves this when he submerges himself into his essential
self and thus transcends himself.

Through meditation he may be

able to savour the delights of true knowledge which is true being.
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Negative theology is the best expression of the religious
faith of a mystic or those of a mystical bent.

With his views of

the Unnamable One, Nicholas had a natural affinity for the mystic's
He wrote one specific work on mysticism, his

approach to God.

only work which is currently in print.

It was intended as a sort

of handbook for the monks at the reformed Benedictine Abbey at
Tegernsee.

Nicholas had visited there in 1452 and was asked by

their prior, Bernard de Waging (author of a work called Lauda
torium doctae ignorantiae), for further help in knowing the JOY
of the knowledge that is beyond reason.

Nicholas responded with

De visione Dei which was completed in 1453 and rapidly became his
most popular work.

1

It contains all the ideas of his original

system but the style is very different for it is written in the
form of a mediation.

It is addressed to God and is full of pas-

sionate images and languages which are seldom found in the mathematically reasoned De docta ignorantia.

It is organized around

the truths which he perceives while he gazes on an "icon" or image
of God which the artist has painted in such a way that no matter
where the viewer stands the eyes in the picture seem to look di
rectly at him.

Through this analogy he can present ideas of Abso

lute Sight co-mingled with the simplicity of the absolute all;
the conditioned view of the beholder in the way he sees, and the
nature of Jesus.
1

It is ideas rather than a series of steps to

Evelyn Underhill, introduction to The Vision of God (New
York, 1960), p. xi.
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achieve the mystical experience that are expressed in this work.
Cusanus does not teach a meditational system but draws his readers
to the joys of knowing the eternal by his own adoration, inspiration and concepts.
The mystical element in Cusanus is strong.

He is generally

acknowledged as a descendent of the fourteenth-century mystics of
Flanders and the Rhineland.

These men had followed St. Augustine

.
.
.
l
and pseudo-Dionysius, as well as St. Bernard and Thomas A quinas.

Evelyn Underhill writes of Nicholas' mysticism that:
More immediately he is the son of that New
Devotion which arose in connection with the
Brothers of the Common Life, and goes back
through their founder Gerard Groote to the
mighty Ruysbroek. Nicholas shares with his
contemporary Gerlac Peterson--and, we must
add, with Thosas
Kempis, his senior by
twenty years--the inheritance of that prince
among mystics. The particular temper of
his mysticism, its mingling of the meta
physical and the personal, of intellectual
subtlety and devotional fervour--so char
acteristic of the Flemish school at its
best--witnesses to the influences which
had moulded his soul.2

a

Cusanus' system of thought makes the realization of God on
ly fully possible in the mystical experience because this is the
way in which supra-rational knowledge can be obtained.
tical experience is necessarily a personal one.

The mys-

He stresses this

in the De visione Dei in the deeply personal experience felt as
the eye of the icon seems to focus totally and lovingly on the
1
Ibid.' p.
2

Vlll.

Ibid., pp. viii, ix.
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"me" of the viewer.

This personal striving is needed to obtain

true knowledge and not corporate experiences.

The person himself

initiates the effort to find God--although this is possible because of his inherent nature.

He receives his uniqueness as a

direct contraction from God and he can return to Him directly by
his own effort.

Nicholas says that "if I render myself by all

possible means like onto thy goodness, then according to the degree of that likeness, I shall be capable of the truth."

1

The individual strives for his personal experience of God.
Although he does this through union with the truth, his indiv
iduality is not lost but fully obtained in the total committment
to the Being.

Self-hood is never absorbed.

When the individual

chooses to be truly himself he obtains both himself and God.
When I rest in the silence of contemplation,
Thou, Lord, makest reply within my heart,
saying:
Be thou thine and I too will be
thine. 0 Lord, Thou Sweetness most delectable,
Thou hast left me free to be mine own self.
Thou art not mine, for Thou dost make free
will needful, since Thou canst not be mine if I
am not mine own. Since Thou hast left me
free, Thou dost not constrain me, but Thou
2
awaitest that I should choose to be mine own.
The most critical element in Cusanus' theology is the individual
and his personal choice to unite with the infinite through his
own infinite essence.

Laws, sacraments, positive theology are

secondary even though worthwhile to this comprehension of God.
1

oe visione Dei, IV.
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This experience is totally personal and although the language and
ideas express the deepest possible humility, they also express
that the religious experience is essentially a process within the
individual personality.
Mysticism is a logical result of Cusanus' metaphysic and,
as we have seen, he is grouped with other mystics because of his
theology.

We know of his indebtedness to pseudo-Dionysius whom

he had thoroughly studied in the late 1430's,
mystics.

1

and also to other

It remains to be asked if his ideas on mysticism con-

tribute at all to the idea of individuality.

Mysticism in general

can have a tendency to isolate the individual from the dictates
of Church authorities or tradition.

The mystical experience is

so profound and personal that it is inexpressible, and no one can
challenge the validity or deny the truth that it conveys.

Thus,

the individual becomes his own authority for what is true and he
is more likely to accept his truth which he has experienced than
the truth given him by intermediaries.

Thus the mystics such as

Cusanus emphasize in the strongest way the role of the individual
in knowing God.

This is certainly not to say that most mystics

were not involved in the church community, and most were surely
confident that they were part of church tradition.

Yet it can-

not be denied that mysticism is a highly personal means of
1
Morimichi Watanabe, The Political Ideas of Nicholas of Cusa
(Geneva, 1963), discusses Nicholas' growing involvement with the
study of pseudo-Dionysius after he left the Council of Basel.
See pages 31-33.
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establishing a relationship with God.

Cusanus emphasized the

ultimate frustration of any other path to God except learned ig
norance which must ultimately reach beyond the rational by the
search of the individual intellect and the action of the individual
will.

Each unique contraction of the divine essence finds his

own vision of God.

Although the Church also taught the sanctity

and bodily resurrection of the individual and the idea of indiv
idual commitment, mysticism seems to place less emphasis on the
role of the Church itself.

Even though Cusanus stayed within the

discipline and format of the traditional Church, his entire meta
physic and its inherent mysticism underscore the powerful and sig
nificant role of the individual in determining truth and choosing
his course of action.

The individual stands alone and meets God

through his own self-hood.

No one studying Cusanus and other

mystics could entirely ignore this sense of the individual's in
dependence and individuality.
The last point to be considered about Nicholas' religious
thought and its relationship to individuals arises in the problem
inherent in mysticism:

what is the role of the Church?

The last

chapter of De docta ignorantia is devoted to this topic and it
reads like an appendage because the Church fits rather uncomfor
tably into his metaphysical system.

Nicholas was a cardinal in

the Church and we know that he was devoted to the cause of Church
unity which for him expressed the unity of God's truth.

However,

although Nicholas says all the correct and traditional things
about the Church, it does not fit into his system the way the
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individual-Absolute relationship does.

He says that the church

militant is a union of all those united to Christ as parts are
to the body and that after death when all men rise by the power
of Christ, the Church triumphant will also be a union of these
varied parts encompassing each person in his own hierarchical
niche.

Because the Church victorious will be maximal ecclesias

tical unity when it consists of all those bound to Christ and
existing through Hirn, it will then coincide with the nature of
Jesus '' althoJgh it does not seem as perfect as the hypostatic
union, which is one of natures only, or as the first divine sim
plicity, in which no other diversity could exist, it is neverthe
less resolved by Jesus into the divine unity from which it took
its rise" (De d. ig., III, xii).

It is clear and consistent in

Cusanus' approach here that the Church is a quasi-entity formed
by individuals.

The Church cannot be a reality in itself in his

metaphysical scheme which states that reality can reside only in
individuals.

The Church then is the idea or the natural union

of those in Christ who are already united in their common essence,
the intellect of Jesus.

Although Nicholas was not attempting to

explain here the sacraments and their necessity, if any, or the
ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church, it is still obvious that
he does not stress the idea of the institutional Church.
never mentioned as a required intermediary to God.

It is

The way to

salvation is through Christ, the maximum universal or intellect,
and the individual can choose this eternal life because his being
is a limitation of that intellect.
the Church does not save him.

He helps to make the Church;
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The individual in Cusanus' understanding could not look to
the Church as a dispenser of absolute truth.

As no absolute can

exist outside of the One, the Church itself cannot be perfect.

And

as no person can comprehend the total truth anyway, each is left
with the relative truths formed in his intellect which can always
be more true by infinite degrees.

Thus at best the Church can be

the teacher of relative truths of the faith as they are best under
stood and interpreted at the highest levels of intellect at any
given moment.

No authority can actually express the truth which

is inexpressible.

A few individuals may rarely experience the

truth by momentarily transcending the rational order, but human
rational truth is learned ignorance.

While Nicholas himself

seemed to have absolute faith in the teachings of the Church and
worked zealously for its improvement and unity, his system does
not logically allow for a Church which dispenses absolutes nor
which is a required intermediary to God.

Every viewpoint within

the Church is conditioned and individual.
However, although knowing he lacks the full truth, the indiv
idual in Cusanus' system has the confidence that what he does possess
is at least some of the truth.

Each intellect is a contraction of

the truth and thus part of the truth.
Nicholas' religious thought.

This has implications in

Nicholas expressed a great deal of

religious tolerance in his writings, for example, which is inevi
table in the sense that he felt that all peoples must have some de
gree of the truth for there is one truth, the maximum of all things
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that can be thought.

1

Although salvation could only come through

Jesus, each religion had some truth and could be led eventually
to the highest available truth.
Another example of Nicholas' view that all people share
the truth is seen in reading his De mente.

In this work he dis-

cusses the union of all philosophical truths but, moreover, he
makes it clear that these truths are known to any individual.
De mente is a dialogue in which an orator and a philosopher come
to visit a common artisan (idiota) to learn about human thought
and existence.

Nothing could state as clearly that Cusansu felt

that truth is possessed by any thinking intellect.

Authority or

a top position in a hierarchy of power is not necessary.

The

truth does not reside in an institution or exalted position but
in individuals.

This is the significance of Cusanus' religious

thought.

1
cusanus, De pace fidei.

CHAPTER VI
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUALITY
IN CUSANUS' SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT
Throughout his life Nicholas of Cusa maintained an astonishing interest in mathematics and science considering the heavy
demands of his ecclesiastical career.

He wrote many scientific

works and experimented with instruments such as an hygrometer for
measuring moisture in the atmosphere.

1

He also suggested the use

of the balance to aid the development of a quantitative chemical
2
theory.

These scientific endeavors were not separate from his

metaphysical speculations but were a natural correlation of his
belief in the reality of the things of this world and their re
lationship to the infinite whole.

His scientific works comple

ment his philosophical works and thus increase our knowledge of
his attitude toward the reality and relativity of which the in
dividual is a part.
Nicholas' metaphysic fostered the scientific attitude to
ward knowledge and experimentation which in turn supports his
concept of individuality in a measurable reality.

Nicholas held

that no absolute truth was available to man but he believed that
information could always be more true.

1

Crombie, p. 127.

2 Ib"id., p. 255.
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This approach to knowledge
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leads both to a tendency to challenge casually stated truths and
to a desire to acquire more accurate knowledge.

As we have seen,

Nicholas felt that this knowledge could only come from the active
pursuit of facts and observations in the natural world.
could the intellect form universal concepts.

Only then

Although this com-

prehension was ultimately possible because the individual's mind
was modeled on the creative Mind, nothing could be understood
without the effort of the person gathering and sorting information
through his senses and reason.
abstract concept.

Accurate facts give a more reliable

Thus careful observation and measurement are

basic to understanding this world or a higher reality.

Secondly,

this measurement and analysis was worthwhile because of Nicholas'
premise of continuity in nature.

Because he felt that all things

are formed as contractions of the absolute essence of the One,
then all things are essentially alike and, therefore, related.
This attitude, along with his idea that the intellect needed accurate facts, encouraged in Nicholas the use of the empirical
method.

Nicholas in fact is credited with many contributions to

the development of scientific methods of research.

In his book

on the history of medieval science, A. J. Crombie states that
Nicholas was part of the early trend of "skeptical empiricism"
which "had done its work of directing attention to the conditions
of human knowledge which had produced some of the most important
clarifications of scientific methodology."
1

Ibid., p. 35.

1
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Nicholas' empirical attitude was expressed everywhere in his
writings.

It was founded, of course, in his absolute acceptance

that reality--other than the one transcendent Reality--resided
only in this world in each individual thing.

Throughout De docta

ignorantia he states many times that each thing in the world resides in its own "number, weight and measure."

This individual-

ness is achieved by a unique combination of factors which he calls
potency, act and nexus in one sense or which he calls the inter
relatedness of the elements and operation in another sense.

Thus

the study of an individual thing yields information from which
general analogies can be made while maintaining its totally unique
identity.
Because of his attitudes toward individuality, reality and
uniformity in nature Nicholas was fascinated with weight and measure.

One of his dialogues in the Idiota is devoted to this to-

pie.

In this work he tells of an experiment with a willow (which

was later utilized by an innovator in the scientific method, Johan

.
1)
Baptista van Helmont .

His recognition of the interrelatedness

of the elements, the possibilities for measurement and his idea
of method are illustrated in this example:
Orator: There is a saying that no pure element is
to be given. How can this be proved by the Ballance?
If a man should put a hundred weight of
Idiot:
earth into a great earthen pot, and then should take
some Herbs and Seeds, and weigh them, and then plant
or sew them in that pot, and then should let them grow
1

Ibid., pp. 256, 258.
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there so long, until he had successively little by
little gotten an hundred weight of them, he would
find the earth very little diminished, and when he
came to weigh it again: by which he might gather
that all the aforesaid Herbs had their weight from
the water. Therefore, the waters being ingrossed
(or impregnated) in the earth, attracted a ter
resterity, and by the operation of the Sunne upon
the Herb were condensed were condensed into an
Herb . If these Herbs be then burnt to ashes,
mayst thou not guesse by the diversity of the
weights of all, how much earth thou foundest more
than the hundred weight, and then conclude that
the water brought all that? For the elements
are convertible one into another by parts, as we
find by a glass put into the snow, where we find
the aire condensed into water and flowing in the
glass.1
In this work Nicholas also suggested the balance be used as a way
to measure the resistence of the air.

His plan of using the ba-

lance as a hygrometer was later described by Leon Battista Alberti
(1404-1472) and Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519).

2

Cusanus was interested in many other aspects of natural
science.

For example, he advocated ideas on blood and circula-

tion studies, and, as we shall note more fully later, he specu
lated in astronomy as well.

These interests demonstrate his in-

volvement with the reality of this world and his belief that hu
man thought could progress through the application of thought to
data taken from empirically gathered facts.

Nicholas' metaphysic

led him to the empirical method and it has been shown that his
work had a direct influence on many who advanced the growth of

l

Cusanus, The Idiot in Four Books (London, 1650), quoted in
Crombie, p. 100.
2

I b.id., p. 101.
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1
modern science, including Da Vinci, Harvey and Linacre, Descartes
and others.

2

Kepler acknowledged his debt to Divinus mihi Cusanus.

3

What are the implications of Nicholas' scientific attitude
for the concept of individuality?

First of all, individuals a-

chieve great significance because they in effect become the independent judge of what is true.

This happens when something is

considered real only if it is recordable and measurable.

If science

in general, or Nicholas in particular, views reality as embodied
in individual things from which observable facts can be taken in
order to form general concepts, then what is true is basically
sought in what can be empirically determined.

Other sources of

information (such as revelation, myth, authority, etc.) appear to
be less reliable.

While Nicholas clearly believed in the truth

of revelation, he stressed that we confirm and grow closer to this
truth by determining facts (and thus concepts) about actual finite
thin9s.

The agent which determines these facts and draws these

conclusions is each individual intellect which will also reject
information which does not appear accurate.

The individual nat-

urally seeks and judges what is true and what is true is what has
being or reality.

The only reality we can comprehend and deal

1

cited in Dolan, p. 6, from R. Creutz, Medizinish-physical
isches Denken bei Nicolaus von Cues (Heidelberg, 1939), pp. 14-31.
2

Edmond Vansteenberghe, Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues (Paris,
1920), pp. 449, 458.
3

rbid., p. 450, note 3.
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with is the measurable, natural world.

Secondly, in addition to

being his own judge of truth, the individual is emphasized by the
very emphasis on this world.

Somehow the involvement with the

facts of nature seem to me to focus attention on progress in know
ledge about this world and on those who form it.

While for Nicholas

these facts heighten awareness of God, it would seem as likely
that they would heighten individual awareness of the self, its
potential and its environment.
Another aspect of Cusanus' science has bearing on the per
ception of the individual.

This was his view that the earth is

a star in a centerless universe.

Cusanus had many views on grav

ity, impetus and a limitless universe which were the result of
his metaphysical speculations.

Not possessing a telescope, his

ideas emerged as a result of his thoughts on relativity and they
have proved to be astonishingly accurate.
Cusanus argued that there can be no material center to the
universe because there can be nothing in the universe which is an
absolute.

Everything that exists is a mixture of potency, act

and nexus and therefore no point of absolute rest can exist about
which planets could move.

Without a center there is no circum

ference so the universe can only be explained in terms of God
who is at once the center and the circumference, the absolute
maximum and the absolute minimum.

There is nothing beyond the

universe which could contain it and "while it cannot be infinite,
it cannot be conceived as finite, since there are no limits within which it is enclosed" (De d. ig., II, xi).

With this established
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he goes on to say that "it is evident from the foregoing that the
earth is in movement...and that it does not describe in this movement the minimum circle."

In addition, "neither can the sun, moon

or any sphere describe a true circle by its movement since its
movement cannot be on a fixed point" (De d. ig., II, xi).

Nicholas

realizes that when we accept this view of the earth that we ac
cept that our perception of the world through our senses is not
true but only relatively true.

Thus, he says, "it is evident that

this earth really moves though it seems stationary to us" (De d.

i_g_., II, xii).

The earth "is inclined to be spherical" and its

movements and all movements on it are designed for the perfection
of the whole (Ibid.).

The earth is merely a part of "the plan of

the universe" and "stands in some relation or comparison, unknown
to us, to the whole region of the world, and that in consequence,
through the intermediary of the universal region a certain rela
tionship springs up between the inhabitants of this earth or re
gion and the inhabitants of other stars..." (De d. ig., II, xiii).
Nicholas' metaphysic requires a cosmological view of the
earth and the individuals upon it.

This is the inevitable result

of his universal-individual view of reality.

Reality resides in

two places and two conditions--absolutely in the Totality and re
latively in the individual.

However, when viewing the earth from

the vantage point of the universe, the individual must take a new
and rather complex view of his own role.
significant and insignificant.

He becomes at once both

There are no realities between

himself and the One and he and his planet are as relatively the
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center of things as anything else.

He is not at the bottom of

some celestial hierarchy but the equal of all as participants in
a vast, limitless universe.

On the other hand, this view of the

earth and the self is rather humbling.

If sensory information is

wrong, then it seems that nothing can really be as it appears,
except perhaps the self.

If the earth is not the center of things,

it is merely a cog operating in an immense system.

If God is no-

where and/or everywhere, perhaps he is no more than the sum of
all things.

These thoughts are inevitable when the individual

recognizes himself in this total scheme.

Nevertheless, Nicholas'

metaphysic requires the individual (which was, of course, revolu
tionary then and commonplace now) to accept his planet as a relative existence.

It is impossible to view the self in an abstract

sense without being aware of the self.

If there are no realities

between the individual and the Totality and the entire whole is
seen as inextricably involved, then intervening structures of any
kind offer less identity to the individual and he is forced to
look more for his identity in himself or in the Totality - the
two realities.

I think that Nicholas' universal view of reality

requires of the individual a heightened sense of the self which
for some, finding it hard to identify with an unknowable maximum,
may lead to loneliness or despair.
However, the individual-universal approach of Cusanus to
reality, expanded in his idea of a centerless universe, did not
leave him in despair.

His science was founded in optimism and

was designed to irrefutably argue the truths of faith.

Cusanus
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had never placed God in a specific reality for he� Reality.
His God had never been a static Being but a creative Process.
The relationship between the members of the Trinity actively
formed the universe so that God was not only the transcendent
reality but a dynamic and intimate one.

God was within the uni

verse and man and He attracted humans to Him through their admiration of his creation:
Who could help admiring this craftsman who in
spheres and stars and in the vast stellar spaces
employs such skill that, with no discontinuity,
achieves in the widest diversity the highest
unity, in one single world so weighing and ad
justing the vast bulk and position and movement of the stars, so minutely ordering the
distances that lie between them, that each astral
area, if it is to be, and the universe if it is
to continue, must be just as it is and in no
other way....He in each star so adjusts and
proportions the parts to each other that there
is in each a movement of parts that secures
the whole.... (De d. ig., II, xiii)
God lies in light inaccessible which is "universally desired"
and Nicholas says that if anyone wonders who they are or to what
purpose they are or how they came to be there can be no answer
for "He only knows by whose intelligence we are what we are" and
to what purpose.

The glory of the universe leads each person to

seek Him and it is in this search that the individual will find
his answer for "all things in Him are Himself, nothing can be
wanting to thee" (De d. ig., II, xiii).

Thus the view of the

earth in a centerless universe leads Nicholas to seek God.

This

will bring an ultimate joy to the individual who, made in God's
image, can become one with Him and understand with Him. Intellectual
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desire combined with admiration for the designer of such a wonderful universe leads man to know that he is one with that universe.

The science of Cusanus is based in optimism.

are capable of thinking and of union with God.

Individuals

Aware of himself

in the universe he does not feel alienated or alone but drawn to
the totality of which he is truly one.
Nicholas' speculations in science and astronomy were not
without some significance on the development of science in general,
as was noted earlier, for his writings were analyzed by thinkers
who followed him.

His idea that the earth is in motion directly

1
influenced Giordone Bruno and consequently Copernicus.

His works

were even the object of a group study:
The little Cusanian school which flourished in
Italy about 1450, survived until the end of the
century, as evidenced by the academic assembly
which met at a chateau in Milan, in 1498, with
Louis Marliani, Gabriel Pirovano, Louis Paciolo,
Leonardo da Vinci and a throng of scholars,
admirers of Nicholas of Cusa, but the philosophy
occupied them less than the exact sciences.2
Perhaps Nicholas' positive view of the intellect and its ability
to measure and comprehend the world, along with his ideas of em
pirical method, encouraged and influenced these specific individ
uals.
1

For example, Vansteenberghe cites Clemens, Giordano Bruno
u. Nicolaus von Cues. Also, Tyrone Lai, "Nicholas of Cusa and
the Finite Universe," Philosophy Today, 11 (April, 1973), 161,
cites Descartes and Kepler.
2
vansteenberghe, p. 449, note 1, cites De Divina proportione
de Lucas de Paciolo (Venice, 1509) as confirmation for this meeting.
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Nicholas' metaphysical system and its related scientific
ideas were speculative undertakings, formulated without the aid

of scientific instruments.

However, his thoughts are in aston-

ishing accord with the view of reality taken by contemporary
scientists and astrophysicists.

While I do not wish to digress

from the topic of Nicholas' attitude toward the individual, it
seems worthwhile to note that his view of the reality and rela
tivity of the things of the universe are substantiated today both
as actuality and ultimate mystery.

Nicholas would have believed

that ascertainable facts could lead us to a clearer understanding

of an unknowable truth and that this would have implications for
the individual, his knowledge of himself and his search for the
Source.
Nicholas' ideas of the minimum and maximum as one, the intricate balance and interrelatedness of all things, the uniformity

of essence, the concept of space and the formation of the universe
by a single, utterly simple emanation are current facts and/or
theories.

Astronomers now agree, evidently with few exceptions

because of recent findings in radio astronomy,

1

that the universe

began in a single instant of collapse when temperature in a primal
concentrate reached 10,000 million degrees.

The entire mass of

material that now forms the universe of our observation--the Milky
Way and at least 100,000,000 other galaxies--was present at this
l

·

Sir Bernard Love 1 1, "Whence: We Are What We Know About Where
We Come From" New York Times Magazine (November 16, 1975), 27ff.
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instant.

In order to explain the dynamics of the universe scien-

tists have had to abandon the idea that space was absolute:
In 1916 Einstein overcame these difficulties
by abandoning this concept of an absolute space
in which bodies could exist independently. The
equations of his general theory of relativity
describe the behavior of the universe as a whole.
In the theory, space is not an absolute entity
its properties are determined by the bodies con
tained in the universe. The solutions of the
equations of relativity provide us with expand
ing models for the universe evolving from zero
radius at the beginning of time.... The great
difficulty is that these evolutionary models
for the universe inevitably predict a singular
condition of infinite density of infintesimal
dimensions before the beginning of the expan
sion. In this the theory confounds itself and
erodes our confidence in the applicability
of the laws of physics to describe the initial
condition of the universe....But now we know
from measurements of the microwave background
radiation that the universe is isotropic.
Furthermore, some recent theorems have dem
onstrated that in general relativity, the
effects of self-gravitation inevitably lead
to isotrophy and hence to the singular con1
dition of the universe in its initial stage.
In this quotation from an article by Sir Bernard Lovell, professor
of radio astronomy at the University of Manchester, we see Cusanus'
basic metaphysical conception that a single, utterly simple essence
formed in a sjngle moment all that could be in limitation and that
this was at once the minimum and maximum of all.

There is no cir-

cumference to the universe and it can only be explained in terms
of relationships.

It becomes rationally impossible to explain the

maximum-minimum universe and yet it is to this fact that reason leads.
1

Ibid., pp. 84 and 86. (my italics)
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Like Cusanus, Lovell marvels at the intricate balance of the
universe and the sensitive molecular structure which determined
the universe in the first second of time.

He says, "It is a re-

markable fact that the existence even of stars and galaxies de
pends on the force of attraction between two protons."

Without

this balance (if the hydrogen atoms in the nuclei had been a per
cent higher) the hydrogen necessary to the evolution of the uni
verse would have been transformed into helium in the first moment
of time.

Man's beginnings were in that same instant and Lovell

stresses that "a remarkable and intimate relationship between
man, the fundamental constructs of nature and the initial moments
of space and time seems an inescapable condition of our existence."

1

Nicholas would have concurred with these ideas that we

cannot grasp the Source but are inextricably involved with it.
Nicholas' metaphysic assisted in the development of early science
and it is science which has come to support through research his
original conceptions.

The implications for the individual are

consequently the same in that he can accept his reality and in
volvement with the One but can never reach or know it through
his own power.

1

Ibid., p. 88.

CHAPTER VII
SOME COMMENTS ON CUSANUS' POLITICAL THOUGHT
A complete discussion of the political thought of Nicholas
of Cusa is beyond the scope of this paper and its concern with
the place of the individual in his metaphysical system.

De docta

ignorantia is not a political work and any conclusions from it
about Nicholas' political theories would be quite secondary and
would have to be inferred from the foregoing pages.

However, it

should be briefly noted that Nicholas did write a work of politi
cal theory, De concordantia catholica, early in his career while
attending the Council of Basel in 1433.

Later in life his let

ters and other articles gave a changed conception of papal authority and church government.

Because the De concordantia catholica

pre-dates his metaphysical system and because of his deep involve
ment with the Council, a look at these may indicate some of the
sources of his metaphysic, particularly his view of the nature
of individuals.

Interestingly neither the De concordantia catholica nor
Nicholas' later support of the absolute authority of the pope
actually violates the thinking of De docta ignorantia.

The dual

ity of his thought is always there and if one emphasizes the in
dividuals coming together to form the whole, we recognize the
element of consent and constitutional arrangements in his early
thinking.

However, if the emphasis is on the total unity from
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which maximum being descends through a hierarchy of beings, then
we see the principle of unity expressed through the person of the
pope.

Events in Nicholas' life, as well as his observations at

the Council, probably account for the shift in his thinking.
Many writers accuse him of opportunism, and_ he clearly was ac
tive in always promoting his career, but others would say with
equal effect that after seeing a council in action he knew that
he could hardly hope to achieve his goals of unity and reform
through such a cumbersome body.
Some understanding of the theory of the conciliar movement
is helpful, I feel, in indicating the positions which helped
shape Nicholas' thought, and, of course, I am stressing the areas
which would influence his thoughts about the importance and effec
tiveness of individuals.

The De concordantia catholica was writ-

ten in support of the conciliar movement.

This movement was the

result of attempts of concerned Christians to heal a forty-year
schism in the Church (1377-1417) which was a matter of tragic
concern to those who viewed the Church as a symbol of concensus
and unity in a common society.

The Schism, states Brian Tierney

in his Foundations of the Conciliar Theory, became a constitutional
crisis within the Church and caused a ferment of intellectual
activity in the attempt to find alternative theories to that of
plentitudo potestatis which was held by the two unyielding popes.
1

Brian Tierney, Foundations of The Conciliar Theory, (Cam
bridge, 1955), p. 2.
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He says that eminent theorists such as Conrad of Gelnhusen, Jean
Gerson, Dietrich of Niem, Pierre d'Ailly, Nicholas of Cusa and
Cardinal Zabarella reasoned that no one, not even the pope, could
act against the well-being of the Church.

1

In the first major

work of conciliar scholarship after the Schism, Conrad of Geln
husen argued that there is a Universal Church (congregato fidel
ium) and a Roman Church (pope and cardinals), and that when Christ
promised that his Church would never fail, he could only have
meant the Universal Church because clearly popes, cardinals and
even early church fathers had failed at times.2

Thus, the under

lying authority of the Church is the congregato fidelium and not
a personification of the Church in the pope.

Conciliar theory

saw the pope as a representative of the Church because of the
power bestowed on him by those whom he was to represent.
Zabarella, (1360-1417), a great juristic scholar, was a
conciliarist who felt that the Church could take away the pope's
authority precisely because it had granted it, and that in con£erring power on the pope the congregato fidelium could not ir
3
revocably alienate its own authority.

His fundamental premise

was that the Church was one great corporation presided over by
the pope and that plentitudo potestatis is a limited and derivative

1

.
Ibid., p. 3.

2 Ib.id., p 4.
.
3

Ibid., p.

s.
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authority conferred upon the head of a corporation by its mem1
bers.

In coming to these conclusions, Zabarella drew his ar-

guments entirely from legal sources developed in the preceding
two-hundred years by the church canonists.

Tierney says of this

tradition:
The transition from the idea of a superiority
inherent in Pope-and-Council to that of a superiority
in the Council acting against the Pope is one of the
most important developments in conciliar theory be
tween the twelfth and fourteenth centuries; and there
were certain elements in early canonist thought that
could encourage the growth of this later doctrine
though it was not usually held by the canonists
themselves. Rather surprisingly, in view of their
frequent references to the divine origin of papal
authority ... the extreme view that papal authority
was in some sense derived from Councils was quite
familiar to Decre"tasts and even found some measure
of support in their work.2
Thus, the canonist writings were the primary source of the conciliar theory.

Nicholas of Cusa was a trained canonist lawyer

and had, in fact, studied under Zabarella's nephew.

The idea of

consent was inherent in these doctrines and probably influenced
Cusanus' thinking then and later.

The idea that power begins

with the One but is potentially in individuals is not unlike his
ideas about the source and potential of human thought.
in this vein:
It is an admirable speculation that in the people
all powers, as the spiritual, temporal and corpor
eal, potentially rests; although for the power of
1

.
Ibid., pp. 221 and 225.

2 Ib"id., p. 55.

He writes

79

ruling to be actually constituted, it is necessary
that from above the formative radiance which thus
sets this into being, since all power is from above
and I speak of ordered power - rightly, just as
earth is the necessary element from which celestial
influences bring forth various vegetables and sen
sible things.1
The second book of the De concordantia catholica develops his
ideas on consent and representation within the Church.
In addition to canon law, Nicholas' arguments in favor of
the conciliar movement seem to rest in other sources.

At times

he seems to be following Roman law and Justinian's Institutes.

2

For example, he says that "if by nature all men are equally free
and equally powerful, a true and properly ordered authority of
one common ruler who is equal in power can only be naturally con.

.

stituted by the election and consent o f others.''

3

This sort of

passage clearly indicates that the ideas of individual equality
and dignity were in his thinking very early.

His goal was to

establish unity through hierarchical channels, and, while he was
not a radical democrat, he was quite willing to find the unity
in the people themselves rather than having it imposed from above.
In many of his comments Nicholas also seems to be following Mar
silius of Padua, a fourteenth-century theorist who wrote a highly
reasoned but polemical work, Defenso� Pacis, against the autho.

rity o f the pope.
l

4

Like Marsilius, Nicholas felt that the majority

. catholica,
.
De concordantia
II, xix.

2

Paul Sigmund, Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political
Thought (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 141-42.
3

.

.

.

De concordantia catholica, II, xiv.

4sigmund, p. 153ff.
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of the people should agree to the laws, that this could only re
sult in the most beneficial possible laws, and that the weightier
.

.

part or the more educated would have to provide leadership.

1

In

a conservative way he advocates majority rule:
Legislation ought to be adopted by all or a majority
of those who are to be bound by it; since it ought
to be conferred on the whole community, that which
touches all ought to be approved by all and be pro
duced only by the consent of all or the major part
of all. Nor can there by any possibility of being
excused from obedience to a law when each one has
imposed it on himself.2
Nicholas drew on many sources for his defense of the conciliar movement and his De concordantia catholica is considered
by ·at least one scholar to be "the last and the most nearly complete expression" of the theories of the conciliar movement and

3
its reaction against current church practice.

Striving for a

universal concordantia through the union of varied groups, Nicholas
designed a plan which recognized and defended the right of indiv
iduals to be involved in that which affected them in both the temporal and secular realms.
As a work of conciliar scholarship the De concordantia
catholica was written very late.

The movement had already sue-

ceeded in reunifying the Church at the Council of Constance in

1

Alan Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua - The Defensos Pacis (New
Haven, 1956) Book I, chapter xii, pp. 3-6.
2
3

De concordantia catholica, Preface, p. 318.
Sigmund, p. 11.
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1417, and by 1433 was actually ending its period of rather Jim
ited effectiveness.

However, the movement had stimulated thought

about the nature of authority and the place of individuals as
suppositories or receivers of that authority.

Nicholas gave a

full expression of these views in his major political work and
we see in them his early recognition of the involvement of the
natures of the individual and the One.

Authority and power re

side in individuals through "the formative radiance which sets
them into being" and acting together they can confer power on a
ruler.

A ruler's authority is a man-made conception, reflecting

the hierarchical degrees of being and thought which are contracted
into the human mind, but the essential power is with the indiv
iduals who are the actual reality.
In his search for a respublica christiana, Nicholas handled
ideas about individuality which are treated more fully in his
metaphysic.

If later he came to feel that unity was better im-

posed from above through the pope than from below through the
people, it is still possible to see in his political theory a
strong consideration of the individual and the idea that it is
human minds which formulate and authorize the institutions and
universals which order the finite world. Power does not descend
down through a series of steps but upward from the godlike na
ture of individual people.

CHAPTER VIII
NICHOLAS THE INDIVIDUAL
Inevitably, after studying the creative output of any per
son a curiosity about his personal life is aroused, and perhaps
even more so if we have been analyzing his views on individuality.
As Nicholas was concerned with individuality, we wonder about his
own.

Two areas about Nicholas are of interest in relation to this

particular study.

Although Nicholas had no theory of personality,

he did believe that everything existed in relativity, so a per
sonality and the development of an individual intellect would not
be absolutes but the product of the interaction of innumerable
factors.

Perhaps two or three of these can be suggested with some

degree of accuracy and, thereby, indicate some of the reasons
Nicholas may have expressed such a strong feeling for the indiv
idual in his view of existence.

Secondly, we may look at Nicholas'

life to see if he sensed and asserted his own individual potential
in any way.

If he actually felt that individuals can think and

act effectively and creatively, we would expect an activist as
well as a contemplative side to his life, even if very limited.
In general the study of Nicholas' life indicates that he lived
in a variety of situations which strengthened the idea of indiv
idual potential as well as an interest in the things of this world,
and that Nicholas was conscious of his own abilities and interests
and within traditional limits took highly personal stands.
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Nicholas was born in 1401 at "the modest village of Cues"
1
on the Mosel River in Germany.

This area is neither remote nor

isolated as it borders several other countries and the town itself had regular contact by the river with larger, neighboring
2
towns.

Whatever the effects of a geographical region on a per-

sonality, there is no question that Nicholas was born into a
middle-class family.

His parents, Catherine Roemer (d. 1427) and

Johan Cryfts (d. 1450/1451) were both from respectable, devout
. .
3
families.

They had two sons and two daughters and the family

lived very adequately from the father's prospering boat company
which operated between Koblenz and Trier.

After examining what

materials are available about the father, Vansteenberghe concludes
that he was "a little unpolished perhaps in character, but honest
and good" but he occasionally manifested "one of those explosions

4
of temper...of which the life of Nicholas himself is not exempt."
Nicholas seems to have been fond of his family, contacting them
over the years, as well as of his village where he established a
hospice, library and chapel which celebrated its five hundredth
anniversary in 1968 and which still houses Cusanus' extensive
personal library.

1

Vansteenberghe, p. 5 and Sigmund, p. 1.

2

Jasper Blystone, p. 298, quoting Havelock Ellis's Genius
of Europe.
3
4

Vansteenberghe, �rbid., p. 5 and 6.

cit., p. 5.
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For some reason, usually attributed to his father's temper,
Nicholas left home between the ages of twelve and fourteen and
was befriended by a local count, Theodoric von Manderscheid, who
sent him to Deventer to be educated.

Almost every source agrees

that Nicholas' studies with the Brothers of the Common Life account
for his strong mystical strain, his dependence on Eckhart,
his excellent background in the classics.

2

1

and

This school emphasized

learning for personal growth--not for learning's sake--piety, and

.
a wi"de variety
o f read"ing.

3

Following their founder, Gerard de

Groot, the brothers wished to achieve and demonstrate Christian
perfection without vows but rather through personal reform, examp1e and humi·1·ity.4

They emphasized that this Christianity was

available to all, not just an ecclesiastical or aristocratic elite.

Deventer's teachings on the equality and personal nature

of Christianity may have stayed with Nicholas; he surely retained
his classical training.
In 1416 at age fifteen he was matriculated at the University

5
of Heidelberg with nine other clerks of the archdiocese of Trier.
He spent three years there, probably earning a baccalaureus in

1

Bett, p. 5 and Underhill, p. viii.

2

Dolan, p. 11.

3

Vansteenberghe, p. 7.

4

Dolan, 2.12.· cit., p. 10.

5

Bett, p. 5.
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artibus from this school whose teachers generally represented a
nominalist philosophy.

1

From there he went to Padua where he

stayed from 1417 to 1423.

The University of Padua was probably

the most outstanding school of its time, rivaled only by Bologna.
Gathered there were the leading minds in the three fields which
attracted Cusanus:

canon law, humanism and mathematics/astrology.

And each of these areas influenced him in the formation of his
thought.

In the area of canon law Padua had teaching at the time

of Nicholas' arrival, Bartholomew Zabarella, nephew of the great
canonist Franciscus Zabarella (1360-1417) who had also taught at
Padua from 1319 to 1411.

2

Here Nicholas was also the student of

3
another leading canonist and humanist, Giuliano Cesarini.

Canon

law was Nicholas' official field of study and he received his doctorate of canon law in 1423 at age 23.

4

At Padua, however, he

also studied under Prosdocimo di Beldomani, a widely respected

5
professor of mathematics and astronomy.

At the same time he be

gan his work and friendship with Toscanelli, the Florentine mathematician.

Moreover, another influence entered his studies at

Padua, one which seems to be slighted in some of the biographical

1

Watanabe, p. 300 and Vansteenberghe, p. 8.

2

Watanabe, p. 301.

3
Watanabe, Nicholas of Cusa, pp. 13 and 29.
4

5

Bett, p. 7.
Vansteenberghe, p. 11.
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materials.

Padua was the center of the humanist movement and some
an interest

aspects of this humanism are seen in Nicholas' work:

in the recovery and disciplined analysis of manuscripts, a sense
of historical criticism of manuscripts, increased study of Greek
and Greek writings, the emphasis on high personal goals for the
individual, and an emphasis on the moldability and improvement of
a man through study.

Although these were not the exclusive do

main of the humanists nor the only things humanists cared about,
they were ideas being strongly promoted at Padua by the men
Nicholas was meeting.

He maintained then and throughout his life

an active correspondence and friendship with many of the men whom
we traditionally label as humanists:

Aeneas Sylvius, Valla,

Bessarion, Traversi, Poggio, Orsini, Pizolpassus, Leonard Bruni,
Thomas Parentucelli, Cesarini, Decembrio and others.

1

Some background is necessary to understand the ferment in
Padua at the time Nicholas was there, and which may also amplify
some of the ideas to which he was being exposed.
nessing a new emphasis in scholarship.

Padua was wit

After the medieval renais

sance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the rapid acqui
sition of Aristotelian logic and Moslem learning, the universities
had expanded.

All of this new material was assimilated, inter

preted and taught and the scholastic method which developed em
phasized logic, speculation and metaphysics.

1

Ibid., pp. 18-32.

The purpose of the

86

resulting systematic study of literary, philosophical, legal and

1
scientific texts was generally clerical or professional training.

In the last half of the fourteenth century, however, some new i
deas on the topics and purpose of education were introduced into
Italy.

Petrarch (1304-1374) had become a great discoverer and

2
collector of ancient manuscripts and his library was "the most
3
remarkable collection of ancient books formed since ancient times.11

This library was preserved at the University of Padua after his
death where his friends continued his interest in classical learning.

The neighboring Venetians also supported this new pursuit

of Greek studies, probably because of their commercial interests.

4

The availability of the manuscripts stimulated a new approach to
critical scholarship, new topics and the desire to learn Greek.
Two famous teachers at Padua in Petrarch's time were Paulas Venetus and P. P. Vergerius, both of whom promoted the new learning.
Vittorini da Feltro, later a great humanist educator, and Guarino
Veronna, who became the best Greek scholar in Italy, came to Padua
5
to study under these men.

(Cusanus' personal library cqntains

1

w. H. Woodward, Vittorino de Feltro and Other Humanist
Educators (Cambridge, 1905), p. 10.
2
A. R. Baca, Selected Letters of Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini
(Northridge, Calif., 1969), p. 140.
3

Woodward,�- cit., p. 3.

4
Ibid.
5

Ibid., p. 5.

1
translations by Guarino and Filelfo, one of the few Italians who
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could read and write Greek in the first quarter of the fifteenth
century.

2

In 1407 Gasparino Barzizza was secured by the faculty

at Padua for its chair of Rhetoric.

He was considered the great

est Latin scholar of the time and he established the Ciceronian
tradition in the revival of the classics.

3

Another noted scholar

at Padua when Nicholas was there was Ugo Benzi, a Hellenist, who
4
probably knew some Greek.

Interest in Greek antiquity was also

stimulated at this time by the presence of Manual Chrysoloras
(c. 1350-1415) who had to come to the Studium of Florence in 1396
5
from Constantinople to teach and translate Greek.

Northern Italy

seems to have been engulfed with excitement and interest in the
new Greek and Latin translations, and as we have seen much of this
study was centered in Padua.
Into this mileau came seventeen year old Nicholas of Cusa
who remained there until he was twenty-four.

The men with whom

he was associated emphasized attitudes and skills which were no
doubt of use to Nicholas.

One of these was the idea that the an

cients could be studied for new approaches to deal with the present:
1
2
3

I b.id., p. 17.
Vansteenberghe, p. 29.

Woodward, p. 10.

4
Vansteenberghe, p. 11 and Bett, p. 6. Watanabe, p. 13,
note 12, says that there is disagreement now as to whether Benzi
actually knew any Greek.
5

Baca, p. 140.
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The purely imitative treatment of Cicero was not
the aim of Barzizza and of other scholars whom he
typifies, such as Zabarella, Vergerio and Vetterino.
In the widest sense these men set before themselves
the reconciliation of the ancient learning with
the Christian life, thought and polity of their
own day; they had no dream of a dead reproduction
of the past.l
Studying the ancients, the humanists then applied these earlier
ideas to their day and stressed as the goal of education prepar
ation for a public life of Christian citizenship.

This was a

chieved through training in eloquence, erudition, physical excel
lence, aesthetics and especially moral virtue.

2

Personal distinc-

tion was not only possible but admirable, and the entire community
benefitted.

Nicholas was a serious student of Cicero and a friend

of many Ciceronian scholars

3

who were in agreement with this goal

of public service and fame through personal and moral excellence.
This goal was founded on the basic humanist concept that man could
be molded or trained to an exemplary state through education.
For example, Vergerio writes this summary of the studia humanitatis:
We call those studies liberal which are worthy of
a free man; those studies by which we attain virtue
and wisdom; that education which calls forth, trains
and develops those highest gifts of body and mind
which ennoble men, and which are rightly judged to
1
2

Woodward, pp. 10-11.
.

.

.

Three typical treatises by Vergius, D'Arezzo and Guarino
are in the Woodward volume. Aeneas Sylvius also expressed these
humanist ideals in his De Liberoreum Educatione.
3

Vansteenberghe, p. lOff.
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rank next in dignity to virtue only. For to a vulgar temper gain and pleasure are the one aim of
1
existence, to a lofty nature, moral worth and fame.
The humanists accepted the perfectability of an individual man
through his ability to choose and then achieve high moral goals.
This idea also implied the possibility of general reform as all
individuals are trainable.

These ideas, especially the faith in

the individual's desire and ability to achieve excellence, are
apparent in Nicholas' thought.

2

Another humanist influence on Nicholas' intellectual development was his interest and analysis of manuscripts.

Many in-

dexes are now available which list Nicholas' considerable per
sonal collection.

3

He is credited with the discovery of an un-

known manuscript of Plautus which contained twenty comedies of
which only twelve were previously known in the West.

4

Nicholas

brought back with him from his trip to Greece in 1438 a Greek
manuscript of pseudo-Dionysius,

5

although there is debate as to

how much Greek he could actually read.
1

6

The fact that Nicholas

vergerio, De ingenius moribus, in Woodward, p. 137.

2
Alan Gewirth, pp. 104, 106. Stresses the independent think
ing in Padua, noting its resistence to papal authority.
3
Jacob Marx's Verzeichnis der Handschriften Sammbing des
Hospitals zu Cues bei Bernkastel al Mosel (1905) was the first.
Others are listed in Watanabe, p. 28.
4
5

Bett, p. 8.
Watanabe, p. 32.

6
vansteenberghe, p. 24, thinks that Nicholas was sent on the
mission because he knew Greek. Honeker, as reported by Watanabe,
p. 17, note 30, says that he did not know any.
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had acquired a critical approach to these texts is illustrated
by his attack on the authenticity of the Donation of Constantine.
Rejecting all summaries and collections, he went back to the orig
inal writings and found that the Donation was not mentioned by any
of the Church fathers and that letters supposedly supporting the
Donation contained distinctions between bishops and clerks which
l
were only made many years later.

Vansteenberghe thinks that

Valla received his inspiration for his famous Declamation, which
destroyed the authenticity of the Donation, from Nicholas and "one
may further remember that Aeneas Sylvius was very intimate at Bale
with the author of the De concordantia catholica before pressing
Frederic III to submit to a council the question of the Donation
of Constantine.11

2

Cusanus approached all manuscripts with the

sort of consciousness of language and historical criticism which
is associated with humanist scholarship.
After leaving Padua and its various scholarly influences,
Nicholas was collated by the archbishop of Trier (January 31,
1425), received benefices which enabled him to study at the Uni
versity of Cologne, a center of Platonism,
circle as his secretary.

3

and then joined Orsini's

In 1432 he went to Basel to defend the

claim of his old mentor's son, Ulrich von Manderscheid, to the
archbishop of Trier.
1
2
3

There he worked with the conciliar party

Watanabe, p. 155.
Vansteenberghe, p. 28.
Watanabe, p. 14.
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until joining the papal forces in 1436.

He was sent to Constan

tinople on a diplomatic mission in 1437 which hoped to reunite
the Church and he returned with the Greek emperor, the patriarch,
and other prelates in February 1438.

1

The remainder of Nicholas'

career was spent in the service of the popes.

He was made a car-

dinal in petto in December 1446 and publically on December 20,

2
1448.

He served as vicar general when Pius II was at the Con-

gress of Mantua and is considered to have been effective in this
work.

3
In addition to his diplomatic and administrative duties,

Nicholas was an inexhaustible supporter of reform, beginning with
some of his works at the Council of Basel.

Two main examples of

his reform efforts are his trip as a papal legate in 1451 and
his attempts at reforming his archbishopric of Brixen from his
arrival in 1452 to his departure in 1460.

In bulls of December

24 and 29 of 1450, the humanist pope Nicholas V appointed Cusanus
as his legate to Germany and its neighboring countries.

He char-

ged him with announcing the jubilee year, offering certain indul
gences, calling and holding provincial councils, levying censures,
visiting and reforming monasteries, regulating or sometimes

1
2
3

Ibid., p. 17.
Bett, p. 38 and Watanabe, p. 18, note 35.

Watanabe, p. 19, and the general conclusion of Bett and
Vansteenberghe.
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abolishing excessive accumulations of benefices, and with preach
1
ing.

As heresies and dissidence were common in the Church at

that time and many rules were openly flaunted, the trip was im
portant and Nicholas, with his knowledge of the language and his
diplomatic background, was well-qualified for this duty.
is generally considered to have been very successful.

His trip

The most

glowing report is found in Pastor who says of Nicholas that "his
life was a mirror of every Christian and sacerdotal virtue."

He

praises the effects of Nicholas' trip:
He not only everywhere admonished and punished
ecclesiastics, and required them to amend, but
also in his sermons instructed to other members
of Christian society in all things necessary, so
that many, of high as well as low estate, laity
as well as clergy, were greatly moved in spirit
by his words.2
Among other things which impressed Pastor were Nicholas' willingness to live the common life on his visit to Deventer, his wear
ing of simple clothes, his occasional use of a mule, and his refusal to meet with his sister until she had changed from her
.

"festal array" to a simple dress.

3

The other reform effort in Nicholas' career was considerably
less successful.

He was appointed to the bishopric of Brixen in

the Tyrol and began active work there in 1451.

1
2

3

Some scholars feel

Vansteenberghe, pp. 89-90.
L. Pastor, A History of the Popes, VII, p. 131.
Ibid., pp. 107-135.

(Sister mentioned on p. 132)
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that Nicholas' personality, ambitions and devotion caused the
violent problems which resulted while others place the blame on
the evil Duke Sigmund.

I have read several minute by minute

accounts of the situation and subsequent developments but it all
comes down to the struggle for power between pope, secular leaders,
bishop and cathedral chapter.

Within this traditional struggle

for rights, the differing personalities acted.
The initial confrontation began over the authority for the
appointment itself.

In 1450 when the bishop of Brixen died, the

local chapter assumed its prerogative of selecting its own bishop
and elected, on March 14, 1450, Leonard Weismayer, one of its
own members who was also the chancellor of the duke of Tyrol,
Sigmund.

They sent the nomination to the pope, Nicholas V, for

confirmation.

However, on March 23, Nicholas appointed Nicholas

of Cusa to this same post.

Legally, the chapter had the right

of election from both traditional and various treaties, including
the Concordat of Vienna in 1448, although the popes had held the
right of reservation since the thirteenth century in order to
prevent unworthy appointments.

Complicating this particular strug

gle was the fact that Eugenius IV had paid off the emperor, Frede
rick III, in 1446 for his support with the lifetime right to nominate candidates to several sees, including Brixen.

By the next

September things were still not settled and the Duke called to
gether the Tyrolese estates to discuss the protection of their
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German rights.

The pope would not surrender, insisted on the

right of appointment although without any clear reason, and per1
.
sonally consecrated Nicholas.

This was the rather unfortunate and hostile beginning to
Nicholas' life in the Tyrol.

There is no question, however, that

a reform-minded bishop was needed in the area for during the conciliar period the dukes had made many inroads into the indepen
dence of the church and there were extensive abuses of church
rules and ideals.

Nicholas left Rome in December, traveling

slowly and reforming towns as he went.

Finally he met with a

mediation board in February to settle the election dispute.

There

were four major points in the agreement, including the garrisoning of his towns and castles with men acceptable to Sigmund and
the promise of an absolutely free election after his resignation.

2

This election compromise was only the first of his troubles.
When Nicholas arrived in Brixen he was fifty years old, devoted
to his cause, and, as Paul Tillinghast wrote, "an extremely suc
cessful man in spite of being bourgeoise, an ex-conciliarist and
a German."

3

As a papal legate he had layed down strict, immensely

detailed and rigourously enforced rules of behavior which he
thought would lead to the desired inner reform.
1
sburg."

It was this

Paul E. Tillinghast, "Nicholas of Cusa vs. Sigmund of HapChurch History, 36 (1967), p. 374.

2 Ib"id., p. 376.

3
Ibid.
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approach that he brought to Brixen.
he worked to make it a model diocese.

During the years 1452-1454,
He traveled everywhere,

gave one hundred thirty sermons and held regular synods.

In the

ordinance of 1453, priests were ordered to give up their concu
bines within a month, to use a standard missal and to meet dress
and behavior standards.

Also, Nicholas began his reform of the

monasteries which he considered the most important step in reforming the whole area.

This process went well until he ran in

to the Benedictine nunnery at Sonnenburg.

Nicholas' struggle

with the abbess Verona von Stuben is a morass of legal and juris
dictional claims and it eventually drew Sigmund into the fray.
Nicholas' fight with the abbess ended in April 1458 with the
1
slaughter of the abbey's troops by Nicholas' soldiers.
While this situation was going on, Nicholas had also alienated some of the powerful families in the area with some of his
strict rules, especially restrictions about festival celebrations.
He had also lost the support of the canons of his chapter by for
cing them to accept his nephew as their bishop.

When that office

had become vacant, the canons preferred Leonard Weismayer, the
former bishop, who had been removed from the archbishopric appoint
ment after the pope consecrated Nicholas.

Henry Bett says of this

act:
Hereupon Weismayer naturally reclaimed his prebend.
Then Nicholas did the most indefensible act of his
life. He remitted the decision to the Chapter of
1

Ibid., p. 386.
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Brixen, but charged them under penalty of excommmu
nication, to confirm his nephew in the prebend, the
revenues being divided between his and Weismayer
until a final decision was reached of the true
bishopric of Church.1
Four canons were excommunicated as a result of their refusal to
submit to this threat.

Relations with Sigmund had also deteri-

orated to a disastrous point and Nicholas believed that at their
summit meeting in May 1457, Sigmund had tried to have him mur
dered.

Although this has never been substantiated, there is no

question that Sigmund was trying to intimidate Nicholas.

In 1458

Nicholas left for Rome and did not return to the area until February 14, 1460, and trouble began immediately.

On that day his

vehicles were attacked and Nicholas placed the entire region under an interdict and threatened to give all the fiefs of the bishopric to the Emperor.
and 3,000 infantry.

2

Sigmund then attacked with 500 horsemen

Nicholas was forced to surrender, sign an

humiliating agreement and pay 10,000 florins ransom.

Naturally

he rejected the validity of these concessions upon his release
and the area remained under interdict until a final settlement
was reached three weeks after Nicholas' death in 1464.
Even this very superficial treatment of Nicholas' years in
the Tyrol indicates the considerable confusion that prevailed.
This turmoil and tension at first comes as a surprise to the

1
2

Bett, p. 60.
Ibid., p. 61.
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reader of the philosophical and religious works of Nicholas.
some extent, however, Nicholas' approach worked.

To

Especially in

the monasteries, his methods of publicizing legislation, ins pecting carefully, requiring detailed reports and strict discipline
worked well, for some of his abbeys were the most reformed in all
Europe.

1

However, by losing the goodwill of nearly all the secu-

lar and church leaders, he lost allies in the battle for a desperately needed church reform.

2

Many of his demands for castles

and other rights could only have been a threat to the duke who
was already in a power struggle with the Emperor.

Perhaps Wata-

nabe is right in saying that "Cusanus failure to understand clearly the extra-legal aspects of the episcopal election" led him to
3
Tillinghast thinks that
the protracted struggle with the duke.
from the beginning a bourgeois Rhinelander would be resented in
the Tyrol and that everything Nicholas did--perpetually cultivating his important outside contacts, alienating canons, offending
Sigmund and the nobility, the promiscuous use of interdicts--only
increased the hostility.

He thinks that:

Nicholas was too petty in the Tyrol. Thus he
ceased to function as the dynamic and passionately
devoted apostle of loving reform, that he showed
himself in his books - even the ones he composed
in Sandres. Instead he became the rule-maker, the
threatener, the devious schemer with foreign powers,

1 Ti· linghast,
p. 378.
1 .
2
Ibid.
3

Bett, p. 64.
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the wielder of ecclesiastical censures, and finally
the man who fled for his life. The greatest mis
take was in keeping him among a people who were
incapable of understanding him, and whom he lacked
the patience to understand. His true home was in
a university or a monastery.... 1
This negative assessment could be answered, I suppose, with com
ments on Nicholas' courage and willingness·to fight for an unpopular but good cause.

It is difficult, however, in reading the

studies of these events in the Tyrol not to sense that Nicholas'
inability to compromise did more harm than good for his long-term
goal.
It is interesting to reflect briefly on the relationship of
Nicholas' work as a reformer to his general thought.

In some

strange way his failures in this area seem to have an indirect
relationship to what could be considered the flaw in his meta
physical system--the problem of personality and evil.

There is

almost no mention of evil in Cusanus' work except for the acknow
.
2
ledgement of Adam's fall and the need for salvation.

The tone

of De docta ignorantia is completely optimistic because it is as
sumed that reason and good intent are natural and will lead people
away from sensual pleasures and toward their only true happiness
which is the intellectual striving to know God.

This positive

approach, of course, reflects Cusanus' faith in the individual's

1

2

.

.

Tillinghast, p. 390.

Cusanus' discussion of this topic is found in chapter IV
of Book III, De docta ignorantia.
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worth, intelligence, educability, and nobility - in other words,
his godlike image.

Evil, if anything, is a lapse from what is

real, but it is not an enigma.

This lack in Cusanus' system has

implications both for reform work and his system in general.

Henry

Bett comments:
It has been remarked by Dorner (Doctrine of the
Person of Christ, ii, p. 46-47) with real insight
that the great defect of Nicholas' Christological
doctrine lies in the fact that he had not arrived
at a knowledge of the significance of the human
personality, and to that knowledge none can attain
who takes as little notice of sin as did Nicholas
of Cusa. Everyone who possesses any religious
instinct must feel that Nicholas' doctrine moves
throughout in a region of bloodless abstractions,
and the reason undoubtedly is that he took so
light a view of the fact of evil.l
Could it be that Nicholas' reform approach reflected such a positive attitude toward human nature that it led him to overestimate
the response to a reasoned approach to God?

Did he ignore the ef-

feet of personal ambitions and desires on individual behavior?
Somehow it seems unlikely that Nicholas, as an experienced diplomat, would have taken such a rigid approach to Sigmund and the
Tyrolese, yet he seems to have been totally confident that he could
effect inner reform through the inflexible imposition of rules.
Perhaps he had too much confidence in.mankind's desire for good
or perhaps he had too much passion for his cause which therefore
justified this approach.

To some extent, Nicholas was the "true

believer" both as a conciliarist and as a cardinal.

1

Bett, p. 199.

In either
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case he was fully committed.

Even his writings on religious tol-

terance never deviate from his belief that there is� way.
What is admirable in such confidence and single-mindedness can
also cause a lack of perspective.

It is a curious thing to me

that Nicholas, who so stressed the idea of relativity in knowledge
and existence, did not apply this understanding to human situations
and beliefs.

At any rate it is impossible to evaluate Nicholas'

reform work and perhaps what appear to be disasters were in the
long run able to bring about some improvements.

His handling of

the Tyrolese is, of course, irrevelant in evaluating his philosophical work although it is of interest in reflecting on his
thought and his life.
Nicholas' life demonstrates his confidence in the individual's ability to think and act effectively.

As a middle-class

citizen the only way up for him was through his personal efforts,
and there is no question that Nicholas was ambitious for success
in this world.

Perhaps this was a result of his middle-class

values, the humanist goal for fame and public service, his relig
ious devotion--or the interaction of all three.

He is heavily

criticized for his "scandalous pluralism" for which he had to ob
tain several papal dispensations in order to hold so many income

.
bene f.ices. l
producing

However, he also gave himself ardently to

the cause of unity and in the eyes of many led a saintly life.

1Bett, p. 17 and note 1, p. 18.
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Whatever conclusions are drawn about the complexities of his ca
reer, his life remains an example of his faith in the reality,
independence, effectiveness and intellectual desires and striving
of the individual.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
It is my thesis that the thought of Nicholas of Cusa gives
great dignity and significance to the human individual.

It was

Cusanus' purpose to establish the idea of unity, and hence the
simple oneness of God, creator and end of all.
however, implies parts.

The idea of unity,

Nicholas, in order to maintain the ab

soluteness of the simple maximum, acknowledges only two kinds of
parts or states of existence--the relative being of an individual
thing and the absolute being of the One.

Thus, I think that it

can be directly demonstrated from his metaphysical system that he
saw the natural world as the only reality other than the Maximum
and that this reality was composed of utterly unique individual
entities.

The human individual exists in this world as a contrac

tion of the image of God and as such is unique and godlike.

He

possesses a free intellect, the highest form of limited being,
which is capable of moving itself to comprehend itself, its en
vironment and the inevitable existence of the simple Whole.

The

intellect further knows that it cannot understand the One but
that it is involved with it.

Although the individual is part of

the relative existence of limited things, he is also real, sin
gular and an influencing participant in the whole.
In a recent review of Cusanian literature I read a criti
cism of his thought which said that Nicholas could never seem to
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make up his mind if he were writing a metaphysic of verite or one
of res.

While I agree that both elements are emphasized, it is

because they are completely involved in each other.

His strength

is in his recognition and balancing of these two realities.

For

him all individuals and oppositions have a final explanation in
the impossible but inevitable simplicity of the maximum-minimum,
and thus verite and res are one.
either.

His metaphysic cannot ignore

Nicholas' thought rests in the paradox or mystery that

while individuals exist in number, weight and measure, and God
exists without being added to or diminished by these individual
things, both exist without confusion in each other.

Within this

unknowable whole the individual lives in both humility and dignity.

APPENDIX
THE WRITINGS OF NICHOLAS OF CUSA
The following list is given to show the chronology and extent of Nicholas' various works.

It shows the wide range of to-

pies which interested him, even during times when his career made
great demand on his time.
1433

De concordantia catholica
Epistolae ad Bohemos

1434

De auctoritate presedendi in concilio

1436

De reparatione calendarii

1440

De docta ignorantia

1440-1445

De guaerendo Deum
De dato Patris luminum
De filiatione Dei
Diologus concludens Amedistarum errorem ex gestis et
doctrina concillii Basaliensis

1447

De genesi

1449

Apologia doctae ignorantiae

1450

De transmutationibus geometricis
De arithmeticis complementis
De guadratura circuli

1451

De sapientia
De mente
De staticis experimentis
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1452

De novissimus diebus

1453

De mathematicis complemnetis
Complementum theologicum
De visione Dei

1453-1454

De pace seu concordantia fidei

1458

De beryello
De matematica perfectione

1459

De aegualitate
De principio
Reformatio gereralis

1460

De possest
Cribratio Alchorani

1462

De non Aliud

1463

De venatione sapientiae
De ludo globi
Compendium

1464

De apice theorae

A great many of Nicholas' sermons and letters have also been edi
ted and published.
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